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SPENDING MEDICARE’S DOLLARS WISELY: TAKING AIM AT
HOSPITALS’ CULTURES OF OVERTREATMENT
Jessica Mantel*
With Medicare’s rising costs threatening the country’s fiscal health, policymakers
have focused their attention on a primary cause of Medicare’s high price tag—the
overtreatment of patients. Guided by professional norms that demand they do “eve-
rything possible” for their patients, physicians frequently order additional
diagnostic tests, perform more procedures, utilize costly technologies, and provide
more inpatient care. Much of this care, however, does not improve Medicare pa-
tients’ health, but only increases Medicare spending.
Reducing the overtreatment of patients requires aligning physicians’ interests with
the government’s goal of spending Medicare’s dollars wisely. Toward that end,
recent Medicare payment reforms establish a range of financial incentives that en-
courage more efficient practices among physicians. Physicians, however, do not
practice medicine in a vaccum. Rather, they are profoundly influenced by the orga-
nizational cultures of hospitals. Far too often hospitals’ cultures lead physicians to
provide Medicare patients care of questionable value. If Medicare is to successfully
contain costs, it must prod hospitals to move from cultures of overtreatment to
cultures of efficiency.
Current Medicare reform proposals, however, do too little to address hospitals’ cul-
tures of overtreatment. That is unfortunate, as regulators will have limited success
in constraining Medicare’s growth if hospitals’ cultures continue to foster the over-
treatment of Medicare patients. This Article therefore sets forth a more robust
proposal for reforming Medicare payment policy, one that would facilitate hospitals
fully embracing a culture of efficiency. Specifically, federal regulators should reform
the Medicare Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program so that a hospital’s Medi-
care payment rates are tied to the hospital’s success in lowering the cost of treating
patients both inside and outside the hospital setting. Regulators could accomplish
this goal by incorporating into the program efficiency measures based on broadly
defined episodes of care.
* Assistant Professor, University of Houston Law Center. Thank you to Nicole
Huberfeld, Jessica Roberts, participants in the University of Saint Louis School of Law’s 2014
Health Law Scholars Workshop, and participants in the University of Houston Law Center
Work-In Progress series for their useful discussion and suggestions; and to Emily Lawson,
Alison Mills, and Theresa Langley for their research assistance.
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Headlines frequently bemoan Medicare’s “runaway” costs,1 and
for good reason. Over the past few decades Medicare spending has
consistently risen faster than the general inflation rate, often by sig-
nificant amounts.2 In 2014, Medicare spending comprised 14.6
percent of the federal budget,3 as compared to only 3.5 percent in
1970.4 This sustained growth in Medicare spending threatens to
bankrupt the program, with the Social Security and Medicare
Boards of Trustees estimating that the Medicare Hospital Insurance
Trust Fund will be depleted by 2030.5
Although the reasons for Medicare’s growth are complex and va-
ried, a primary cause is the high volume and intensity of care
provided to Medicare patients. For most medical conditions, physi-
cians must choose among a range of treatment options, such as
acute hospital care, surgery, drug therapy, life style changes, and
watchful waiting. Many physicians err on the side of doing more for
their patients. They prescribe more drugs, order more diagnostic
tests, perform more invasive procedures, and hospitalize patients
more frequently.
Doing more arguably would be justified if a higher volume and
intensity of care led to improved health for Medicare patients. After
all, conventional wisdom suggests that more frequent care and cut-
ting-edge interventions constitute better care.6 Often, however, this
1. See, e.g., William R. Brody, Taming Runaway Medicare Costs, WASH. POST (Sept. 25,
2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/24/AR20090924
03935.html; How to Rein in Medicare’s Runaway Costs, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 17,
2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-04-17/medicare-costs-give-doctors-incen
tives-to-use-cheaper-drugs; Pragya Kakani, Runaway Medicare and Medicaid Spending, HARV. PO-
LITICAL REV. (Oct. 24, 2011), http://harvardpolitics.com/arusa/runaway-medicare-and-med
icaid-spending/.
2. See LISA POTETZ ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE SPENDING AND FI-
NANCING: A PRIMER 2 (2011) (showing that from 1985–2009, average annual growth in
Medicare spending of 8.5 percent exceeded the annual average consumer price index of 2.9
percent).
3. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:
2015 TO 2025, at 74, 76 (2015).
4. See POTETZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 1. The Social Security and Medicare Board of
Trustees projected even higher growth for Medicare, estimating that the program will grow
to 5.3 percent of GDP by 2035. See SOCIAL SECURITY & MEDICARE BDS. OF TRS., STATUS OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE 2015 ANNUAL REPORTS (2015),
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/index.html.
5. See SOCIAL SECURITY & MEDICARE BDS. OF TRS., supra note 4. The Medicare Hospital
Insurance Trust Fund funds Medicare spending under Medicare Part A. The Trustees esti-
mate that the Supplementary Medicare Insurance fund, which pays the cost of physician
services and other outpatient expenses under Medicare Part B, will remain adequately fi-
nanced into the indefinite future because current law provides for automatic financing
adjustments to meet expected costs. See id.
6. See John Wennberg et al., Extending The P4P Agenda, Part 2: How Medicare Can Reduce
Waste And Improve The Care of The Chronically Ill, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1575, 1577 (2007) (noting
the “widely held assumption that more frequent intervention constitutes better care”).
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conventional wisdom proves untrue. Medicare patients that receive
a higher volume or intensity of care frequently do not enjoy im-
proved life expectancy or quality of life as compared to those
receiving less care. Close analysis reveals the reason for this result—
much of the care given to Medicare beneficiaries is medically un-
necessary, inefficient, or of questionable value.7 In addition, such
care needlessly exposes patients to medical errors and other health
risks.8
Medically unnecessary care includes ineffective and unsafe care,
such as tests that do not provide useful diagnostic or therapeutic
information, interventions that do not improve a patient’s condi-
tion, and care with health risks that clearly outweigh any potential
benefit.9 Researchers have repeatedly documented that far too
often patients in the United States, including Medicare patients, re-
ceive medically unnecessary care.10 For example, contrary to
recommendations from the National Kidney Foundation, more
than seventy percent of Medicare patients with end-stage renal dis-
ease start dialysis with catheters, the least effective and least safe
access method.11 Similarly, studies have found that as many as 21.8
percent of coronary angiographies performed on patients who suf-
fer heart attacks or heart disease are inappropriate.12
7. Wasteful care also includes care that results from failures of care delivery and coordi-
nation and from fraud and abuse. For example, lapses in patient safety and poor
coordination between providers can lead to spending on preventable injuries or complica-
tions. See generally Donald M. Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in U.S.
Health Care, 307 JAMA 1513, 1513 (2012) (describing different types of wasteful health care
spending). These forms of waste are beyond the scope of this Article, which instead focuses
on overtreatment of patients.
8. See infra note 23 (explaining the risks faced by patients receiving medical treatment).
9. See Peter Boland et al., Accountable Care Organizations Hold Promise, But Will They
Achieve Cost and Quality Targets?, MANAGED CARE, Oct. 2010, http://www.managedcaremag.
com/archives/1010/1010.ACOs.html (stating that unnecessary care includes services that do
not provide useful diagnostic or therapeutic information); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Ameri-
can Difference in Health Care Costs: Is There a Problem? Is Medical Necessity the Solution?, 43 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 13 (1999) (a test or procedure is medically unnecessary if it is not appropri-
ate or effective for addressing a patient’s condition); Allison Liptiz-Snyderman & Peter B.
Bach, Overuse of Health Care Service: When Less is More . . . More or Less, 173 JAMA INTERNAL
MED. 1277, 1277 (2013) (defining overuse to include “services where the expectation is that
the potential harms exceed the potential benefits”).
10. See generally Deborah Korenstein et al., Overuse of Health Care Services in the United
States: An Understudied Problem, 172 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 171 (2012) (reviewing the
research literature on clinically inappropriate use).
11. See THE DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH POL’Y & CLINICAL PRACTICE, VARIATION IN THE
CARE OF SURGICAL CONDITIONS: SPINAL STENOSIS 5.13 (2015) (discussing variation in the treat-
ment of Medicare patients with end-stage renal disease).
12. See Korenstein supra note 10, at 175. A coronary angiography is an ex-ray photo-
graph or visualization of the coronary arteries taken after radiopaque materials has been
injected into the patient’s bloodstream. See J.E. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY’S DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE 103 (LexisNexis 2014).
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In addition, some of the care provided to Medicare beneficiaries
is inefficient. Inefficient care includes interventions providing only
slight clinical benefit compared to their costs.13 A commonly of-
fered example of this form of overtreatment is expensive cancer
treatments that on average extend a patient’s life by a few weeks.14
Inefficient care also includes tests and treatments that are more
costly than alternatives of similar therapeutic value.15 For example,
Medicare patients with prostate cancer regularly receive expensive,
aggressive treatments despite the absence of evidence demonstrat-
ing that these treatments are superior to less expensive options.16
Medicare patients also receive care of unnecessary intensity or in
more costly settings than warranted, such as surgeries performed in
the inpatient setting that could have been done in the less expen-
sive outpatient setting.17
Studies also indicate that Medicare patients receive a high vol-
ume of discretionary care of questionable value. Researchers have
found large regional disparities in Medicare spending, with per cap-
ita spending in high-spending regions over two times greater than
that in low-spending regions (even after controlling for differences
in prices and health status).18 Most of this regional variation in
Medicare spending is attributable to differential use of discretion-
ary medical services,19 or services of minimal or unknown clinical
13. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Technology: A Cri-
tique of Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 778, 784 (1986) (defining wasteful medical
technology to include “technologies that do not yield adequate net benefits”).
14. See Ari Hoffman & Steven D. Pearson, ‘Marginal Medicine’: Targeting Comparative Effec-
tiveness Research to Reduce Waste, HEALTH AFFAIRS w710, w713 (2009).
15. See Mehlman, supra note 13, at 789 (“A technology might also be regarded as waste-
ful if it is expected to yield the same net benefit as another technology but at a greater cost—
that is, if it is not the most efficient, cost-effective technology to treat or to diagnose a pa-
tient’s condition.”).
16. See THE DARTMOUTH INST., supra note 11, at 6.13–14 (discussing variation in the
treatment of prostate cancer among Medicare patients).
17. Cf. CTR. FOR THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL SERVS., SUPPLY-SENSITIVE CARE 1 (2007), http:/
/www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/supply_sensitive.pdf (stating that overuse in
health care includes an overdependence on the acute care sector, such as admitting chroni-
cally ill patients to the hospital rather than treating them as outpatients).
18. See Elliott S. Fisher & Kristen K. Bronner, Regional Insights and U.S. Health Care Sav-
ings, in THE HEALTH CARE IMPERATIVE: LOWERING COSTS AND IMPROVING OUTCOMES:
WORKSHOP SERIES SUMMARY 95, 95 (Pierre L. Young & Leigh Anne Olsen eds., 2010) (describ-
ing regional variations in Medicare spending).
19. See id. at 96 (“Almost all of the differences in spending across regions can be ex-
plained by greater use of discretionary medical services.”); ROBERT A. BERENSON & ELIZABETH
DOCTEUR, DOING BETTER BY DOING LESS: APPROACHES TO TACKLE OVERUSE OF SERVICES 3–4
(2013), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2013/rwjf403697
(summarizing evidence suggesting that the provision of inappropriate care failed to explain
geographic variations in the intensity or cost of care, and that geographic differences “can be
explained largely as a difference in use of so-called discretionary services . . . .”).
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benefits.20 For example, from 2001–2011, the rate of inpatient spi-
nal decompressions for lumbar spinal stenosis among Medicare
patients varied more than eightfold across hospital referral re-
gions.21 Yet Medicare patients in high-spending regions do not
enjoy greater life expectancy or quality of life than those residing in
low-spending regions despite visiting physicians more frequently,
making greater use of specialists, and receiving more diagnostic
tests, procedures, and inpatient care.22 In fact, some studies find
that high-spending regions perform worse on certain measures, as
medical interventions often expose patients to medical errors and
other health risks.23
Clearly many Medicare dollars are spent on overtreatment—
wasteful care that is ineffective, unsafe, inefficient, or of questiona-
ble value. Indeed, analysts estimate that between twenty and thirty
percent of Medicare expenditures are spent on inefficient interven-
tions or care of little or unknown value.24 Reducing the
20. See BERENSON & DOCTEUR, supra note 19, at 4 (defining discretionary care).
21. See THE DARTMOUTH INST., supra note 11, at 4.8. A spinal cord decompression is a
surgical operation that relives pressure on the spinal cord. See SCHMIDT, supra note 12, at
104–05.
22. See JOHN E. WENNBERG ET AL., THE DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH POL’Y & CLINICAL
PRACTICE, TRACKING THE CARE OF PATIENTS WITH SEVERE CHRONIC ILLNESS 4, 13, 54 (2008).
These findings hold true even after controlling for differences in the prevalence of disease
and other population characteristics. See id. at 3 (noting that differences in the level of illness
and other patient characteristics account for only a small fraction of the variation in the
amount of care delivered).
23. As explained by researchers at The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy & Clinical
Practice:
[T]he more time spent in the hospital, the greater [patients’] exposure to error, in-
fection, and adverse events. As care becomes more complex, and as more physicians
get involved in an individual patient’s care, it becomes less and less clear who is re-
sponsible, and miscommunication—and medical errors—become more likely.
Greater use of diagnostic tests increases the risk of finding —and being treated for—
abnormalities that are unlikely to have caused the patient any problem. . . . Patients
who receive care for conditions that would have never caused a problem can only
experience the risk of the intervention.
JOHN E. WENNBERG ET AL., THE DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH POL’Y & CLINICAL PRACTICE, AN
AGENDA FOR CHANGE: IMPROVING QUALITY AND CURBING HEALTH CARE SPENDING: OPPORTUNI-
TIES FOR THE CONGRESS AND OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 3–4 (2008).
24. See Fisher & Bronner, supra note 18, at 100–01 (estimating that decreased use of
discretionary services in the Medicare program would lead to a decline in Medicare spending
by eighteen to twenty percent overall, an estimate they describe as “relatively conservative”);
Elliott S. Fisher & John E. Wennberg, Health Care Quality, Geographic Variations, and the Chal-
lenge of Supply-Sensitive Care, 46 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. 69, 76 (2003) (“If the United States
were able to reduce Medicare spending in the highest-cost regions to the level in the lowest-
cost regions, up to one-third of annual Medicare spending could be reallocated to pressing
needs.”). Cf. BERENSON & DOCTEUR, supra note 19, at 1 (“Extrapolating from studies focusing
on particular conditions or services, some analysts have estimated that as much as a third of
U.S. health care spending is unnecessary or wasteful.”).
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overtreatment of patients thus would go a long way toward con-
straining Medicare spending. The question is how best to do so.
Attention rightly has been given to motivating physicians to do
less. Importantly, the Affordable Care Act (ACA)25 seeks to accom-
plish this by changing the way Medicare pays physicians. Yet
payment reform that narrowly focuses on physicians’ financial in-
centives overlooks the broader context in which physicians practice
medicine, namely that most physicians affiliate with hospitals that
powerfully influence physicians’ clinical judgments.
Too frequently a hospital’s organizational culture—its norms,
values, policies, and internal structures—lead physicians to provide
patients with unnecessary, wasteful, or inefficient care.26 Conse-
quently, payment reforms that encourage physicians to reduce the
overtreatment of patients will have limited success if hospitals’ cul-
tures promote the opposite. Tackling the problem of
overtreatment, then, requires shifting hospitals’ organizational cul-
tures from cultures of overtreatment to cultures of efficiency.
Regulators therefore must not only alter how Medicare pays physi-
cians, but also must change how Medicare pays hospitals.
Traditional approaches to paying hospitals and other providers
under Medicare do little to reduce the overtreatment of patients, or
worse, encourage overtreatment. This troubling dynamic has cap-
tured the attention of federal regulators, who, on January 26, 2015,
announced the ambitious goal of shifting ninety percent of Medi-
care payments from traditional payment approaches to new
payment alternatives by 2018.27 Unfortunately, the reforms pro-
posed by government regulators are too modest and do not fully
address hospitals’ cultures of overtreatment. This Article therefore
offers a novel reform proposal that would hold hospitals accounta-
ble when their cultures promote overtreatment of Medicare
patients.
Specifically, this Article argues for linking a hospital’s Medicare
payment rates to the hospital’s success in lowering the cost of treat-
ing patients both inside and outside the hospital setting. This would
be done by expanding the existing Medicare Hospital Value-Based
Purchasing (VBP) Program to include efficiency measures that eval-
uate the average cost of caring for patients with certain conditions,
25. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
26. See infra Part II.
27. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Better, Smarter, Healthier:
In Historic Announcement, HHS Sets Clear Goals & Timeline for Shifting Medicare Reim-
bursements from Volume to Value (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2015
pres/01/20150126a.html.
FALL 2015] Spending Medicare’s Dollars Wisely 127
such as heart disease, cancer, and chronic back pain. Hospitals that,
together with their affiliated physicians, reduce unnecessary or ex-
cessive care in the treatment of the selected conditions would be
rewarded with higher reimbursement rates under Medicare. In con-
trast, inefficient hospitals would be penalized with lower
reimbursement rates. This approach would incentivize hospitals to
shift from cultures of overtreatment to cultures of efficiency.
The Article begins by describing in Part I how Medicare’s design
has contributed to physicians’ overtreatment of patients. Part II
then describes how a hospital’s organizational culture powerfully
influences the clinical practices of its affiliated physicians. In partic-
ular, it explains how the words and deeds of hospital leadership
contribute to patterns of excessive care. This, in turn, explains why
changing how Medicare pays physicians, without simultaneously ad-
dressing hospitals’ organizational cultures, will have limited success
in reducing the overtreatment of Medicare beneficiaries. Part III
evaluates how Medicare currently pays hospitals, and concludes that
more must be done if hospitals are to embrace a culture of effi-
ciency. Part IV sets forth a new payment reform proposal that would
accomplish this goal. Part IV also discusses potential concerns
raised by this Article’s proposal, including the potential for under-
treatment of Medicare patients, and concludes that they do not
render the approach unworkable.
I. PHYSICIANS’ SPENDING OF MEDICARE DOLLARS
Medicare’s design affords physicians unfettered discretion over
the medical care provided to their patients. This discretion allows
physicians to exert tremendous influence over how much Medicare
spends on patient care. Physicians’ control over Medicare spending
would not itself be problematic if physicians spent Medicare’s dol-
lars wisely. Too often, however, physicians adhere to clinical
practices that result in a high volume and intensity of care without
any corresponding increase in patients’ health status. This Part ex-
plains why this is so.
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A. Medicare’s Design
Passage of the original Medicare statute was possible only after
Congress secured the cooperation of the medical establishment.28
The original Medicare statute thus reflects a series of political com-
promises favorable to physicians. Specifically, Medicare’s initial
design shielded the physician-patient relationship from direct gov-
ernment interference, preserved patients’ freedom to choose their
physicians, and protected physicians’ professional independence
and financial interests. These policy choices largely remain a part of
Medicare’s programmatic structure today. The end result has been
a Medicare program that gives physicians a central role in deter-
mining what care Medicare beneficiaries receive, and, by extension,
what Medicare spends on beneficiaries’ health care.29
In enacting Medicare, Congress adopted several design features
that protected physicians’ existing relationships with their patients.
All physicians licensed under state law were eligible to participate in
the Medicare program.30 Medicare also did not employ physicians,
but instead allowed them to maintain their independent prac-
tices.31 In addition, Medicare beneficiaries were free to choose
among the physicians participating in the program.32
Congress also structured Medicare as an indemnity program that
reimbursed physicians and hospitals for all care “reasonable and
necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to
improve the functioning of a malformed body member.”33 As an
indemnity program, Medicare paid physicians and other providers
28. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 375 (1982)
(“In setting up Medicare, Congress and the [Johnson] administration were acutely con-
cerned to gain the cooperation of the doctors and hospitals.”); Nicholas Bagley, Bedside
Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked, 101 GEO. L.J. 519, 526 (2013) (“The original
Medicare statute contained evident markers of the strategic choice to appease the medical
establishment.”).
29. See generally Bagley, supra note 28, at 526–32 (describing Medicare’s initial program-
matic structure and the authority given to physicians).
30. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102(a), § 1861(r),
79 Stat. 303 (defining “physician” to mean a state-licensed physician).
31. See Bagley, supra note 28, at 529 (“In contrast to the Veterans Administration health-
care system, Medicare wouldn’t directly employ its physicians.”).
32. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, sec. 102(a), § 1802.
33. Id., at sec. 102(a), § 1862(a)(1). Generally, Medicare Part A covers inpatient hospital
services, hospice services, skilled nursing facility services, and certain home health care, 42
U.S.C. § 1395d, while Medicare Part B covers physician services, diagnostic services, and dura-
ble medical equipment. 42 U.S.C. § 1395k. However, specific items and services within these
broad categories are excluded from coverage if not deemed reasonable and necessary. 42
U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A).
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on a fee-for-service basis, with providers receiving a separate pay-
ment for each unit of service provided to their Medicare patients.34
Determinations as to whether care was reasonable and necessary
were based on the prevailing standards among medical profession-
als, and in practice, Medicare largely deferred to the treating
physician’s judgment that the provided care was appropriate.35 In
addition, medical necessity determinations did not consider an in-
tervention’s cost-effectiveness.36 This “cost-blind,” “no questions
asked” approach to coverage appeased physicians’ desire for auton-
omy and virtually guaranteed them reimbursement for their
services.37
Although the “reasonable and necessary” language incorporated
into the original Medicare statute remains in force today,38 today’s
Medicare administrators have new powers that in theory allow them
to exercise greater scrutiny of whether the care provided to patients
is medically necessary. Specifically, Medicare administrators may is-
sue coverage policies that dictate when specific interventions are
considered medically necessary.39 In practice, however, these review
procedures are more bark than bite.
The task of developing and implementing Medicare coverage
policies rests with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS), the federal agency that oversees the Medicare program and
34. Social Security Amendments of 1965, sec. 102(a), §§ 1812, 1832. Although initially
the Medicare program reimbursed hospitals and physicians their reasonable costs, today
Medicare’s fee-for-service payment rates to physicians and hospitals are based on fee sched-
ules established by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395w–4(a); 1395ww(d) (2014).
35. See Bagley, supra note 28, at 526 (observing that the original Medicare statute’s exclu-
sion from coverage of care that is not reasonable and necessary “left treating physicians
nearly untrammeled discretion to determine medical necessity”); Sean R. Tunis, Why Medi-
care Has Not Established Criteria for Coverage Decisions, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2196, 2196 (2004)
(explaining that in Medicare’s early years the Medicare program gave significant deference
to physicians’ assessments of medical necessity).
36. The Medicare statute is ambiguous as to whether medical necessity determinations
may consider cost-effectiveness such as whether an intervention’s clinical benefits justify its
costs or whether less expensive alternatives offer similar clinical benefit. See Tunis, supra note
35, at 2197 (“The Medicare statute is silent on the role of costs, and Medicare has not explic-
itly considered costs in making coverage decisions.”). CMS’s proposals to incorporate cost-
effectiveness criteria into the coverage determination process met fierce industry resistance
and cries of government rationing, leading CMS to abandon its attempts to do so. See generally
Jacqueline Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost: Medicare Decisions, Transparency and Public Trust, 79 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1, 18–21 (2011) (summarizing CMS’s efforts to adopt cost-effectiveness criteria);
Eleanor Kinney, The Affordable Care Act and the Medicare Program: The Engines of True Health
Reform, 13 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 253 (2013) (same).
37. See Bagley, supra note 28, at 526–27. Cf. STARR, supra note 28, at 291–306 (describing
the medical profession’s preference for indemnity payments over other forms of payment).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A).
39. See infra note 41 (explaining national and local coverage determinations).
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Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs),40 the private organi-
zations that review Medicare claims.41 CMS and MACs
unfortunately lack both the administrative resources and clinical ev-
idence necessary for developing coverage rules for the thousands—
perhaps millions—of different treatment decisions made by physi-
cians.42 MACs also rarely have the necessary clinical information to
enforce existing guidelines or otherwise conduct meaningful review
of individual claims.43 Consequently, physicians continue to exer-
cise tremendous discretion over whether care is reasonable and
necessary.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395h(a), 1395u(a) (delegating responsibility for coverage determina-
tions, including determinations of medical necessity, to MACs).
41. Both CMS and MACs issue generally applicable rules regarding coverage of particu-
lar health services or items. At the national level, CMS issues national coverage
determinations (“NCDs”), or instructions to MACs directing them on whether to grant or
deny coverage for specific care. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(f)(1)(B) (defining national coverage de-
terminations). In the absence of an NCD, MACs may issue local coverage determinations
(LCDs), which apply only to the claims reviewed by the MAC issuing the LCD. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ff(f)(2)(B) (defining local coverage determinations). MACs also review medical neces-
sity determinations on a case-by-case basis based on a patient’s particular factual situation. See
Michael John DeBoer, Medicare Coverage Policy and Decision Making, Preventive Services, and Com-
parative Effectiveness Research Before and After the Affordable Care Act, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L.
493, 505 (2012).
42. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL
TREATMENTS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR AN EXPANDED FEDERAL ROLE 11 (2007), http://www.
cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/12-18-comparativeeffectiveness
.pdf (explaining that less than half of all medical decisions are supported by adequate evi-
dence regarding an intervention’s effectiveness); Jessica Mantel, A Defense of Physicians’
Gatekeeping Role: Balancing Patients’ Needs with Society’s Interests, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 633, 690–93
(2015) (arguing that government lacks the administrative resources to issue explicit rules of
rationing for the full range of medical decisions); Brenda Sirovich et al., Discretionary Decision
Making by Primary Care Physicians and the Cost of US Health Care, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS 813, 814
(2008) (discussing a review by BMJ Clinical Evidence finding that more than half of treat-
ments for a variety of conditions fall into medicine’s gray zone). Continuous advancements
in medical knowledge and technology also necessitate frequent modification to NCDs and
LCDs, further tasking CMS and MACs’ resources. See Hoangmai Pham et al., Episode-Based
Payments: Charting a Course for Health Care Payment Reform, NIHCR POL’Y ANALYSIS, Jan. 2010, at
7, http://www.nihcr.org/Episode_Based_Payments (“[G]uidelines change over time as scien-
tific evidence grows, and regularly updating guideline-based payment rates could be a costly
and time-consuming endeavor.”).
43. See Bagley, supra note 28, at 551 (“Checking whether providers have complied with
LCDs . . . requires detailed clinical information—information that is rarely found in claims
forms.”); BERENSON & DOCTEUR, supra note 19, at 4 (“[T]he determination of appropriate-
ness requires review of clinical information, which generally cannot be ascertained from
claims data.”). Although MACs sometimes request the relevant clinical information from
providers, they do not have sufficient resources to do so for every claim. See Bagley, supra note
28, at 551 (“[T]he cost of collecting clinical information on millions of claims related to
thousands of different LCDs would be prohibitive.”); SEAN R. TUNIS ET AL., URBAN INSTIT.,
IMPROVING THE QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY OF THE MEDICARE PROGRAM THROUGH COVERAGE POL-
ICY 1 (2011), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412392-
Improving-the-Quality-and-Efficiency-of-the-Medicare-Program-Through-Coverage-Policy.pdf
(stating that even when NCDs are developed, CMS and MACs “often lack the resources to
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In essence, Medicare’s design delegates to physicians primary re-
sponsibility for deciding what care is provided to Medicare
beneficiaries, with minimal government oversight. In giving physi-
cians this role, “Congress surrendered direct control over the size
of Medicare funding” to the physicians, who “collectively establish
what the government . . . pay[s] out for medical services.”44 This
delegation would not, in and of itself, be problematic if physicians
acted consistently with the government’s interest in spending Medi-
care’s dollars wisely. As explained below, however, Medicare’s
design assures the opposite.
B. The Overtreatment of Medicare Patients
In an ideal world, medical science would provide a clear answer
as to whether a particular intervention is medically appropriate for
a given patient. More often than not, however, the practice of
medicine involves a high degree of clinical uncertainty and ambigu-
ous value trade-offs.45 For many treatments, we simply lack
authoritative evidence on clinical effectiveness.46 Even when such
information is available, physicians may question the potential ben-
efits and risks for an individual patient given the substantial
variation among patients.47 In addition, medicine’s inherent com-
plexity makes assessment of appropriateness difficult, as “[t]he final
assure that the policies are implement as written”). The vast majority of claims thereby escape
scrutiny. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., BETTER TARGETING OF MEDICARE’S CLAIMS REVIEW
COULD REDUCE IMPROPER PAYMENTS 297 (2011) (stating that less than one percent of Medi-
care’s claims are subject to a medical record review by trained personnel).
Recovery audit contractors (RACs) also conduct post-payment claims review in order to
identify improper billing of Medicare. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(h)(1). However, they generally
employ data mining and other analytical techniques to identify potentially improper claims
that lead them to focus on a small subset of submitted claims. See Timothy P. Blanchard,
Medicare Medical Necessity: Avoiding Overpayments, Penalties and Fraud Allegations, AM. HEALTH
LAWS. ASS’N 7 (2011) (discussing RACs’ claims review process).
44. Bagley, supra note 28, at 527.
45. See Jessica Mantel, The Myth of the Independent Physician: Implications for Health Law,
Policy and Ethics, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 455, 471–77 (2013) (discussing uncertainty and
ambiguity in the clinical setting).
46. See Amitabh Chandra et al., Who Ordered That? The Economics of Treatment Choices in
Medical Care, in 2 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 402–03 (Mark V. Pauly et al. eds., 2011)
(“In many clinical situations, there are no authoritative guidelines or consensus treatment
recommendations.”).
47. See Jost, supra note 9, at 15 (“Given the infinite variability of patients and conditions,
it is often quite difficult to know with any precision how useful any test or procedure will be
ex ante.”); Jessica Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our Cake and Eat It
Too?, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1392, 1420 (2012) (“[A] treatment’s potential clinical benefits
for an individual patient often remain uncertain, with some care that, on average, is of no, or
merely marginal, benefit potentially benefitting some patients.”).
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decision about how to manage a patient requires synthesizing all
the information about a disease, the patient, signs and symptoms,
the effectiveness of dozens of tests and treatments; outcomes, and
values.”48 Medical decisions also often involve difficult tradeoffs,
such as balancing a treatment’s potential health benefits and risks49
or determining whether a intervention’s potential benefits justifies
its costs.50
In navigating medicine’s vast grey zone, physicians must decide
whether to err on the side of doing more versus doing less for their
Medicare patients. Many choose the former, ordering expensive
imaging tests, recommending aggressive treatments over watchful
waiting, or hospitalizing patients rather than caring for them in out-
patient settings. This bias to do more has contributed to rapid
growth in Medicare spending.51 Although physicians’ professional
norms and malpractice fears in part explain high utilization pat-
terns,52 Medicare’s design also is to blame.
Medicare insulates beneficiaries from the full price of their medi-
cal care, so they have little incentive to consider its costs. Indeed,
patients often desire all potentially beneficial care, no matter how
costly or slight its benefits.53 Because Medicare beneficiaries have
48. David M. Eddy, Variation in Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, 3 HEALTH AF-
FAIRS 74, 83 (1984).
49. For example, a medical intervention may yield useful diagnostic information, pre-
vent illness, cure or ameliorate a disease, increase a patient’s life expectancy, or improve a
patient’s quality of life, but also may expose a patient to pain, anxiety, health complications
or death. See Mantel, supra note 45, at 475.
50. See E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits: Restructuring the Legal Standard of
Care, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1997) (noting that medical decision-making involves value
choices, including “decisions about how much money is appropriate to spend” in an effort to
achieve health-related goals).
51. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text (describing the growth in Medicare
expenditures).
52. See Daniel P. Kessler et al., Effects of the Medical Liability System in Australia, the UK, and
the USA, 368 THE LANCET 240, 240 (2006) (reviewing “findings of empirical studies that esti-
mate the effects of tort law on medical care” and concluding that there is “systematic
evidence of defensive medicine” among physicians in the United States); David M. Studdert
et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environ-
ment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2612, 2615 (2005) (stating that recent survey evidence shows
“widespread” defensive medicine practices among physician in certain high-risk specialties);
Wennberg et al., supra note 6, at 1577 (commenting that driving the frequent use of “supply-
sensitive” care, or care lacking sufficient evidence on clinical effectiveness, is “the widely held
assumption that more frequent intervention constitutes better care—and that whatever re-
sources are available should be fully used in managing difficult cases.”). Elsewhere I have
explained how the current medical malpractice system promotes the overtreatment of pa-
tients and suggested possible reforms that would reduce the defensive practice of medicine.
See Mantel, supra note 42.
53. See Jost, supra note 9, at 15 (“[I]f the questioned test or procedure is likely to be of
any benefit, the informed patient may expect or demand it.”); Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore
R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Healthcare
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the freedom to choose among physicians, physicians who fail to sat-
isfy their patients’ demands to “do everything possible” risk losing
patients to those who will do so.54 Physicians therefore face
competitive pressures to provide their Medicare patients with more
care, particularly expensive, technology-driven procedures.
Medicare’s fee-for-service payment structure reinforces this dy-
namic. By paying physicians for each unit of service provided, fee-
for-service rewards doing more.55 Physicians, for example, can in-
crease their Medicare reimbursements by scheduling their
Medicare patients for repeat office visits, additional diagnostic
tests, or multiple invasive procedures.56 Fee-for-service also en-
courages more costly interventions by reimbursing sophisticated,
labor-intensive tests and procedures at higher payment rates than
less intensive interventions.57 These higher payments also en-
courage physicians to become specialists,58 who tend to favor more
Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 458 (“The reliance on third-party payments to finance
medical care strengthens patients’ own bias towards using whatever methods are available
when their health is at stake.”).
54. Cf. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, Jr., The Fiduciary Obligation of
Physicians to “Just Say No” If an Informed Patient Demands Services That Are Not Medically Indicated,
39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 358–59 (2009) (observing that pressure to sustain and increase
“patient flow” causes physicians to “feel pressure to satisfy and retain patients as if they were
customers in a retail business”).
55. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REWARDING PROVIDER PERFORMANCE: ALIGN-
ING INCENTIVES IN MEDICARE 25-26 (2007) (discussing the incentives of the Medicare fee-for-
service payment system that result in overutilization); Arnold S. Relman, Doctors as the Key to
Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1225, 1225 (2009), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/
10.1056/NEJMp0907925 (“Most doctors are paid on a fee-for-service basis, which is a strong
financial incentive for them to maximize the elective services they provide[,] . . . a major
factor in driving up medical expenditures.”). Indeed, empirical studies have documented
that physicians paid on a fee-for-service basis provide more care to their patients than physi-
cians paid under alternative payment models, such as capitation or salary. See Robert Town et
al., Market Power and Contract Form: Evidence from Physician Group Practices, 11 INT’L J. HEALTH
CARE FIN. ECON. 115, 131 (2011) (“Numerous papers have demonstrated an empirical link
between [fee-for-service] payment and increased provision of services . . . .”).
56. See Gloria Bazzoli, Medical Service Risk and the Evolution of Provider Compensation Ar-
rangements, in UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF HEALTH
CARE 144 (Peter Hammer et al., eds., 2003) (“[A]s the agent for a patient, a physician will
increase the supply of services as long as his or her marginal reimbursement exceeds margi-
nal costs . . . .”).
57. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, The Perfect Storm of Overutilization, 299 JAMA
2789, 2789-90 (2011) (commenting on the impact of fee-for-service paying significantly more
for procedures, rather than for evaluation and management).
58. See Hoangmai Pham & Paul B. Ginsburg, Unhealthy Trends: The Future of Physician
Services, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1586, 1590 (2007) (“[L]ow incomes for [primary care physicians]
make these career paths unattractive to new physicians. Among recent medical school gradu-
ates, a falling number choose to train in primary care specialties . . . .”); Bryan Vaughn et al.,
Can We Close the Income Gap Between Specialists and Primary Care Physicians?, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS
933 (2010) (explaining that because physicians have much greater wealth potential if they
choose a specialty career than if they choose a primary care career, medical students typically
choose the former).
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high-tech, invasive tests and procedures over less costly alterna-
tives.59
Finally, Medicare’s coverage determination process does little to
squelch providers’ incentives to provide a high volume and inten-
sity of care. As noted above, Medicare’s coverage determination
process is highly deferential to physicians’ judgments on medical
necessity,60 making it unlikely that Medicare will question a physi-
cian’s decision to do more for her patient. Moreover, lax
enforcement of existing coverage rules has left Medicare adminis-
trators unsuccessful in deterring the wide-spread adoption of new
and costly technologies.61 The exclusion of cost-effectiveness as a
criterion for Medicare coverage also encourages the provision of
marginally beneficial care.62
As discussed above, regrettably, doing more for Medicare pa-
tients often does not improve their health. Studies of regional
variation show that Medicare patients living in high-spending re-
gions do not enjoy improved life expectancy or better health
outcomes than those residing in low-spending regions.63 Research-
ers also have documented that Medicare patients time and again
receive inappropriate care or inefficient care.64 Far too often, then,
Medicare’s dollars are spent on care of questionable value. If we
wish to change this dynamic, we must motivate physicians to reduce
the volume and intensity of care they provide patients.
II. LOOKING BEYOND PHYSICIANS: HOW HOSPITALS’
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES PROMOTE OVERTREATMENT
In an effort to address physicians’ overtreatment of Medicare
59. See Mantel, supra note 47, at 1405 (explaining how fee-for-service encourages greater
specialization among physicians and expensive care).
60. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
61. See Tunis, supra note 35, at 5 (stating that “the dearth of information available to
contractors” leads to missed opportunities to prevent widespread adoption of technology of
questionable value, and noting that a study found that seven out of the eight selected cover-
age policies setting forth coverage conditions for the specified technology did not
measurably change providers’ use of the technology); Bagley, supra note 28, at 551 (arguing
that in part due to lax enforcement of NCDs and LCDs, the Medicare coverage determina-
tions process has not “deter[red] Medicare’s physicians from adopting novel and unproven
technologies”).
62. See Steven D. Pearson & Peter B. Bach, How Medicare Could Use Comparative Effective-
ness Research in Deciding on New Coverage and Reimbursement, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1796, 1796–98
(2010) (decrying Medicare coverage and payment policies that ignore whether a service is
cost-effective because it creates “perverse incentives to develop and then overuse expensive
services”).
63. See supra notes 18–23 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 9–17 and accompanying text.
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patients, regulators have sought to align physicians’ financial inter-
ests with Medicare’s programmatic goal of preventing care that is
medically unnecessary, inefficient, or of questionable value. Specifi-
cally, the Affordable Care Act established the Physician Value-Based
Payment (VBP) Modifier,65 which, beginning in January of 2015,
links a physician or physician group’s reimbursement rates to their
performance on various cost and quality measures.66 The cost mea-
sures are designed to evaluate physicians’ efficiency; those who
successfully lower costs receive superior performance ratings than
those who do not.67 Higher performing physicians receive an up-
ward adjustment in their rates under the physician fee schedule,
65. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 3007, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(p)).
66. Physicians receive two composite scores, the first based on their overall performance
on the selected cost measures and the second based on their overall performance on the
selected quality measures. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SUMMARY OF 2015 PHY-
SICIAN VALUE-BASED PAYMENT MODIFIER POLICIES 14–15 (2014), http://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/PhysicianFeedbackProgram/Downloads/
CY2015ValueModifierPolicies.pdf.
Initially the Physician VBP Modifier applies only to physicians in groups of one hundred
or more physicians and other “eligible professionals,” but will apply to all physicians in 2017.
See Medicare Program: Revisions to Payment Policies under the Physician Fee Schedule, 77
Fed. Reg. 68991, 69306 (Nov. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Revisions to Payment Policies I]. The
Medicare statute defines an “eligible professional” to include physicians, physician assistants,
nurse practitioners, clinical nurse specialists, certified registered nurse anesthetists, certified
nurse midwives, clinical social workers, clinical psychologists, registered dieticians, nutrition
professionals, audiologists, and physical, occupational, and qualified speech-language ther-
apists. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(k)(3)(B).
67. For 2015, CMS has incorporated into the Physician VBP Modifier five efficiency mea-
sures: total per capita cost and per capita costs for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD), heart failure, coronary artery disease (CAD), also known as heart disease, and dia-
betes. See Revisions to Payment Policies I, supra note 66, 77 Fed. Reg. at 69320 (explaining the
Physician VBP Modifier). Total per capita cost measures the average cost of all care provided
to a physician group’s patients under Medicare Parts A and B, while the remaining measures
calculate the average cost of all related Parts A and B care provided to a physician group’s
patients with the relevant condition, with adjustments made for differences in patient’s risk
factors and regional payment rates. See id., 77 Fed. Reg. at 69315, 69317. For example, the per
capita cost for diabetes measures the average cost of all diabetes-related care provided to the
physician group’s diabetic patients. In the future, CMS intends to incorporate additional
condition-specific efficiency measures into the Physician VBP Modifier. See Medicare Pro-
gram: Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule, Clinical Laboratory
Fee Schedule & Other Revisions to Part B for CY 2014, 78 Fed. Reg. 74230, 74229, 74786
(Dec. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Revisions to Payment Policies II].
For 2015, Medicare beneficiaries are attributed to the physician group that provides the
plurality of primary care services received by a beneficiary. See Revisions to Payment Policies I,
supra note 66, 77 Fed. Reg. at 69319. The Physician VBP Modifier thereby incentivizes pri-
mary care physicians to actively oversee and coordinate all care provided to Medicare
beneficiaries in an effort to reduce the volume and intensity of care provided to their pa-
tients by other providers. For example, a primary care physician seeking to reduce per capita
costs may refer her patients for fewer diagnostic tests, admit fewer patients to the hospital,
and favor lower cost specialists over higher cost specialists when referring patients for spe-
cialty care. Cf. Andrew M. Ryan & Matthew J. Press, Value-Based Payment for Physicians in
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while poorer performing physicians receive lower payments.68 Ac-
cordingly, Medicare will pay higher rates to efficient physicians
than less efficient physicians who provide similar quality care. The
Physician VBP Modifier thereby aligns physicians’ financial interests
with the government’s goal of reducing the volume and intensity of
care.69
The Physician VBP Modifier is an important step toward reduc-
ing physicians’ overtreatment of Medicare patients. Nevertheless,
payment reform that narrowly focuses on physicians’ financial in-
centives overlooks a fundamental component in the overtreatment
story—the impact of health care organizations’ cultures on physi-
cians’ treatment decisions, particularly hospitals’ organizational
cultures.
As noted above, physicians frequently face uncertainty as to how
best to manage their patients’ care.70 How a physician navigates
medicine’s grey zone is largely a function of her professional intui-
tive,71 which in part reflects the customs of the medical profession
Medicare: Small Step or Giant Leap?, 160 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 565, 565–67 (2014) (noting
that the attribution methodology under the Physician VBP Modifier “pushes primary care
providers to manage patients across the continuum of care,” but noting that “[e]ven if pri-
mary care providers want to refer their patients to specialists who provide higher-value care,
they may not know who those specialists are” and may “receive care from specialists to whom
they were not directly referred by their primary care providers.”).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(p). For 2015, physicians classified as low cost/high quality, low
cost/average quality, and average cost/higher quality will receive an upward adjustment in
their payment rates; physicians classified as low cost/low quality, average cost/average qual-
ity, or high cost/high quality receive no adjustment in their payment rates; and physicians
classified as average cost/low quality, high cost/average quality, and high cost/low quality
will receive a downward adjustment in their payment rates. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDI-
CAID SERVS., supra note 66, at 15 tbl. 4 .
69. The recently enacted Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 pro-
vides that the Physician VBP Modifier be combined with the current Physician Quality
Reporting System and Electronic Health Records/Meaningful Use programs into a single
Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) program beginning in 2019. Under MIPS,
physicians who score highly will receive bonuses. Physicians’ scores will be based on four
categories: quality (thirty percent), resource use (thirty percent), meaningful use of elec-
tronic health records (twenty-five percent), and clinical practice improvement activities
(fifteen percent). Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2105, Pub. L. No. 114-
10, § 101.
70. See generally Mantel, supra note 45, at 471–77 (describing why much of medicine
involves uncertainty and ambiguity).
71. See JAMES L. BOWDITCH & ANTHONY F. BUONO, A PRIMER ON ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV-
IOR, 45 (7th ed. 2007) (“People often use schemas, cognitive frameworks that systematize our
‘knowledge’ about . . . other people, situations, objects and phenomena.”); Mark P. Higgins
& Mary P. Tully, Hospital Doctors and Their Schemas About Appropriate Prescribing, 39 MED. EDUC.
184, 185 (2005) (defining schemas as “ordered patterns of mental representations that en-
capsulate all our knowledge regarding specific objects, concepts or events”).
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and a physician’s personal ideals, training, and experience.72 How-
ever, a physician’s professional judgment also is strongly influenced
by the organizational culture of her affiliated hospital—its norms,
values, organizational resources, and internal structures.73 At times,
a hospital’s organizational culture encourages physicians to prac-
tice more cost-conscious care. Often, though, the opposite holds
true, with a hospital’s organizational culture leading to patterns of
overtreatment among its affiliated physicians both within and
outside the hospital’s walls.
When the Physician VBP Modifier and a hospital’s organizational
culture work at cross-purposes, the latter may curb the former’s suc-
cess in reducing physicians’ overtreatment of Medicare patients.
Accordingly, changing physicians’ practice patterns requires not
only realigning physicians’ financial incentives, but also adopting
Medicare payment policies that promote hospital cultures of effi-
ciency and cost-conscious care.
This Part describes how hospitals’ organizational cultures influ-
ence physicians’ clinical decisions. Part III then examines whether
current Medicare payment policy and reform proposals adequately
address hospitals’ cultures of overtreatment.
A. The Role of Hospital Leadership
Leaders play a fundamental role in shaping an organization’s
culture.74 Leaders articulate the organization’s values, establish for-
mal policies and standards of conduct, and allocate organizational
rewards and status.75 They also communicate an organization’s
norms and values by what issues they pay attention to, the priorities
they set, and their own conduct.76 Research in the field of organiza-
tional culture confirms that these actions strongly impact the values
and behaviors of the organization’s members.77
72. See Mantel, supra note 45, at 484.
73. See generally id. at 484–505.
74. See, e.g., EDGAR SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 235–58 (4th ed.
2010) (describing the ways in which leaders embed and transmit culture); A. Verbos et al.,
The Positive Ethical Organization: Enacting a Living Code of Ethics and Ethical Organizational Iden-
tity, 76 J. BUS. ETHICS 17, 22 (2007) (“Leaders’ key role in influencing ethical practices in
their organizations is well established in the business ethics literature.”).
75. See SCHEIN, supra note 74, at 237, 247–49, 256–57 (describing how leaders shape an
organization’s culture through formal statements of organizational philosophy, creeds, and
charters; and how they allocate rewards and status).
76. See id. at 236–43, 245–47 (describing various informal ways leaders shape organiza-
tional culture).
77. See M. Grojean et al., Leaders, Values, and Organizational Climate: Examining Leadership
Strategies for Establishing an Organizational Climate Regarding Ethics, 55 J. BUS. ETHICS 223, 224
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The hospital setting is no exception—hospital leaders powerfully
shape their organization’s cultures, which in turn influence institu-
tional clinical practices. As described below, a hospital’s leadership
establishes the overarching values and norms that guide hospital
personnel, including its affiliated physicians. They also impact phy-
sicians’ clinical judgments through various policies that bear on
physicians’ self-interest. Finally, hospital administrators’ decisions
regarding the amount and mix of available clinical resources
strongly shape institutional patterns of care. Unfortunately, these
actions often contribute to a culture of overtreatment rather than
one of cost-consciousness.
1. Establishing Overarching Values and Norms
Through their words and deeds, hospital leaders shape their in-
stitutions’ overarching values and norms. Leaders committed to
reducing overtreatment may voice support for a practice norm of
frugality, ban from their facilities pharmaceutical and medical de-
vice representatives pushing new, costly therapies,78 or purchase
clinical decision support software that assists physicians in making
cost-effective medical decisions.79 Alternatively, hospital leaders can
promote a culture of overtreatment by emphasizing “being on the
cutting-edge” and “doing everything possible” for patients, di-
recting physicians to utilize expensive technologies to boost the
(2004) (explaining how organizational leaders influence other organizational members’ per-
ceptions and norms); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations
and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS
L.J. 1, 22 (2003) (commenting that the beliefs and values of others within an organization,
particularly its leaders, are often better predictors of an individual’s behavior than the beliefs
the individual brought to the organization).
78. Studies have found that physicians who interact with pharmaceutical sales represent-
atives both prescribe drugs at a higher frequency and prescribe higher cost, lower quality
drugs as compared to physicians who did not interact with pharmaceutical sales representa-
tives. See generally THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, CONFLICTS-OF-INTEREST POLICIES FOR
ACADEMIC MEDICAL CENTERS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BEST PRACTICES (2013), http://www.
pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/0001/01/01/conflictsofinterest-policies-for-
academic-medical-centers (summarizing the findings of twenty-nine studies). Some commen-
tators have called on hospitals to adopt policies limiting pharmaceutical and medical device
representatives’ access to physicians and other personnel. See id.; Managing Visits from Pharma-
ceutical Sales Representatives, INST. FOR SAFE MEDICARE PRACTICES, May 22, 2008, www.ismp.org/
newsletters/acutecare/articles/20080522.asp. Several hospitals have heeded these recom-
mendations and now deny pharmaceutical and medical device representatives entry to their
facilities. See George R. Gooch et al., The Moral from Sorrell: Educate, Don’t Legislate, 23 HEALTH
MATRIX 237, 262 (2013).
79. Cf. Barrett T. Kitch et al., Systems Model of Physician Professionalism in Practice, 19 J.
EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 1, 9 (2013) (explaining that decision support software can be
used in ways that “assist physicians in making cost-effective medical decisions”).
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hospital’s reputation,80 or adopting clinical decision support
software that encourages physicians to provide costly care of ques-
tionable value.81
These and similar managerial actions greatly influence institu-
tional patterns of care among a hospital’s physicians. Social
scientists have found that an organization’s individual members in-
ternalize the values, norms, attitudes, and behaviors promoted by
the organization’s leadership, a process that often occurs subcon-
sciously.82 This suggests that if a hospital’s leadership demonstrates
a commitment to reducing overtreatment, physicians will internal-
ize this norm and practice more cost-effective medicine. In
contrast, if a hospital’s leadership espouses that more medicine is
better medicine, physicians will respond by providing more care of
higher intensity.83
Although few have studied this issue closely, interviews with phy-
sicians and hospital leaders in Minneapolis and Miami confirm the
importance of leadership in promoting a norm of either efficiency
or overtreatment. Experts have identified Minneapolis as a region
providing high-quality, low-cost care to Medicare beneficiaries;
80. See Bjorn Hofmann, Is There a Technological Imperative in Health Care?, 18 INT’L J.
TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 675, 685 (2002) (describing the “institutional imperative” to
use technology, including hospital policies to use certain technologies as part of an overall
competitive strategy or to increase the institution’s status).
81. For example, Health Management Associates, Inc. (HMA), a for-profit hospital
chain, allegedly used clinical software that was quick to flag emergency room patients as
meeting the criteria for inpatient admission or a series of diagnostic tests. See Ruth SoRelle,
DOJ Joins Whistleblower Suits against HMA, EMERGENCY MED. NEWS, Mar. 2014, at 1, 25–26
(describing various HMA practices that led to excessive inpatient admissions and diagnostic
tests).
82. As I have explained elsewhere, this dynamic stems from individuals’ powerful need
for meaningful social relationships, which leads individuals to conform to the group’s norms
in an effort to secure continued acceptance within the group. See Mantel, supra note 45, at
490–91. In addition, over time an individual will come to identify with the organization, gen-
erating loyalty to and investment in the organization’s values and adopting the organization’s
goals and interests as her own. See id. at 493–94.
83. Individuals who identify strongly with an organization generally are more committed
to the organization and more likely to internalize its norms and values. Therefore, the impact
of a hospital’s organizational culture on physicians’ treatment decisions likely will increase as
various trends strengthen the ties between hospitals and physicians. These trends include
physicians moving away from solo and small group practices and accepting salaried positions
with hospitals. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Apprehensive, Many Doctors Shift to Jobs With Salaries, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2014, at A14 (noting that in 2013, sixty-four percent of job offers filled
through Merritt Hawkins, one of the nation’s leading physician placement firms, involved
hospital employment, with the firm anticipating this trend to increase in the next two years).
In addition, physicians increasingly rely on institutions to provide them capital, technology,
and staff. More frequent clinical collaborations between physicians and hospitals also pro-
mote greater interdependence. See Mantel, supra note 45, at 495–97.
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whereas Miami represents a high-cost, low-quality region.84 Respon-
dents interviewed in Minneapolis repeatedly noted that the
policies, procedures, and public statements and actions by local
hospital executives demonstrated their support for cost-effective
medicine.85 These actions promote a culture of frugality that leads
to “physicians practising [sic] with an awareness of the cost of care
they provide.”86 Conversely, Miami respondents “did not report that
this type of culture was present in their practice settings.”87
Unfortunately, the culture of frugality among Minneapolis hospi-
tals is the exception and not the rule. As discussed in detail in Part
III.A, under current Medicare payment policies, a hospital’s bottom
line benefits when the hospital does more, not less. With Medicare
payments linked to the quantity of care, hospital administrators
with an ounce of good business sense88 aspire to treat more patients
and expand the volume of services.89 Current Medicare payment
policies also skew hospitals toward more costly interventions, as
more sophisticated, labor-intensive tests and procedures garner
higher payment rates than less intensive interventions.90 Conse-
quently, hospital leaders generally promote a culture that
encourages physicians to increase their “productivity” by treating
more patients and performing more profitable procedures.91
2. Shaping Physicians’ Self-Interest
A hospital’s leadership also influences clinical practices through
various policies that impact physicians’ self-interest. Psychologists
studying cognitive motivation have found that individuals have a
84. See Kitch et al., supra note 79, at 3 (explaining the rationale for selecting Minneapo-
lis and Miami as sites for the study).
85. See id. at 8–9 (discussing the support of leadership at Minneapolis hospitals for cost-
effective care).
86. Id. at 6.
87. Id.
88. SHANNON BROWNLEE, OVERTREATED 85 (2007).
89. See Donald M. Berwick et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS
759, 761 (2008) (noting that “[u]nder current market dynamics and payment incentives, it is
entirely rational for hospitals to try to fill beds and to expand services.” In doing so hospitals
believe “they can protect profits best by protecting and increasing revenues.”); see also Harold
D. Miller, From Volume to Value: Better Ways to Pay for Health Care, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1418,
1418–19 (2009), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/5/1418.full.pdftˇml (“Physi-
cians, hospitals, and other providers gain increased revenues and profits by delivering more
services to more people . . . .”).
90. See Emanuel & Fuchs, supra note 57; see also infra notes 125, 127, 128.
91. See BROWNLEE, supra note 88, at 116 (noting that hospital administrators exert subtle
pressures on physicians to “keep up their productivity by performing more profitable proce-
dures,” especially physicians “working in profitable departments”).
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subconscious tendency to form initial judgments that support con-
clusions that promote their own self-interest.92 More conscious
deliberations then perform the secondary role of rationalizing the
self-serving conclusion.93 Accordingly, physicians may be subcon-
sciously biased toward making clinical decisions consistent with
their personal self-interest, as shaped by hospital policies.94 For ex-
ample, if a hospital rewards those physicians who admit a high
volume of patients, a physician will be cognitively motivated to in-
voke heuristics, or mental shortcuts, that favor admitting a patient
(e.g., “better safe than sorry”) or to conclude that the patient’s cir-
cumstances warrant an invasive procedure (e.g., the patient has a
low-risk of complications from surgery). In contrast, if the hospital
rewards frugality, a physician will be cognitively motivated to justify
less aggressive care (e.g., the patient is a poor candidate for
surgery).95
The case of Health Management Associates, Inc. (HMA), the na-
tion’s fourth largest for-profit hospital chain, illustrates this
92. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term: Forward: Neutral Principles, Motivated
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (2011) (describing
“the unconscious tendency of individuals to process information in a manner that suits some
end or goal”). For example, studies have found that individuals have faster reaction times
when generating and endorsing memories and beliefs consistent with conclusions that pro-
mote an individual’s self-interest or desired ends. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated
Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULL. 480, 483–85 (1990) (summarizing studies on biased memory
search).
93. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 105 (2011) (explaining that
deliberative processes merely endorse individuals’ initial impressions by providing justifica-
tions for them). See also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Institutions and Organizational Culture, 51
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 959–60 (2007) (“[W]e typically engage in moral reasoning after our
judgments have been formed, and . . . we engage in that exercise in order to justify, rather
than arrive at, those judgments.”). This does not mean deliberative reasoning cannot over-
ride our initial impressions—it can—but doing so requires mobilizing substantial mental
focus, something individuals do infrequently, particularly when their mental capacity is oth-
erwise taxed by the complexity of the situation or performing other tasks. See generally
KAHNEMAN, supra note 93, at 81 (describing the “laziness” of System 2 deliberative cognitive
processes). See also D. Moore & G. Lowenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of
Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 189, 193 (2004) (stating that although “controlled
processes can override automatic processes,” studies have found “that when mental capacity
is constrained because people are under cognitive load, it is harder for them to engage in
reflection and correction of automatic judgments”).
94. See Eugene C. Grochowski, Ethical Issues in Managed Care: Can the Traditional Physi-
cian-Patient Relationship Be Preserved in the Era of Managed Care or Should It Be Replaced by a Group
Ethic?, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 619, 637–38 (1998–1999) (asserting that when making deci-
sions in medicine’s gray area, physicians’ clinical judgments are subconsciously influenced by
financial incentives); Mantel, supra note 45, at 498–505 (explaining how physicians’ self-inter-
est subconsciously biases physicians to make clinical decisions consistent with their self-
interest).
95. See Mantel, supra note 45, at 503–04 (explaining how a physician may be cognitively
motivated to make patient care decisions that promote her self-interest, as shaped by an
organization’s culture).
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dynamic. HMA adopted various policies that made it in the self-
interest of its emergency room physicians to both order multiple
diagnostic tests and frequently admit patients.96 HMA’s practices in-
cluded threatening to terminate physicians who did not increase
hospital admissions and paying bonuses to physicians and medical
directors who met benchmarks for ordering tests and admitting pa-
tients from the emergency room.97 HMA also gave “failing grades”
to physicians who regularly overrode HMA’s software program
when it flagged a patient as meeting the criteria for admission.98
These practices allegedly biased the clinical decisions of HMA phy-
sicians, leading to unwarranted hospital admissions and diagnostic
tests.99
Although HMA’s practices may be extreme, hospitals commonly
adopt practices that align physicians’ self-interest with providing
high-volume, high-intensity care. The bonuses given to physicians
employed by hospitals often are tied to a physician’s billings,
thereby encouraging the physician to order additional diagnostic
tests and other services.100 Hospital administrators also frequently
bestow greater prestige and other perks on physicians who generate
significant revenue for the hospital. For example, a heart surgeon
with a robust practice may be appointed chair of the hospital’s car-
diology department.101 These and similar practices on the part of
hospital administrators contribute to a culture of overtreatment.
96. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Government Intervenes in Lawsuits Against
Health Management Associates, Inc. Hospital Chain Alleging Unnecessary Inpatient Admis-
sions and Payment of Kickbacks (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/govern
ment-intervenes-lawsuits-against-health-management-associates-inc-hospital-chain (stating
that the lawsuits against HMA alleged that HMA leadership “exerted significant pressure on
doctors in the emergency department to admit patients who could have been placed in ob-
servation, treated as outpatients or discharged”); SoRelle, supra note 81, at 25–26 (describing
the HMA lawsuit).
97. See SoRelle, supra note 81, at 25 (describing the specific allegations contained in the
lawsuits against HMA).
98. See id.
99. See Hospitals: The Cost of Admission, CBS (June 9, 2013) http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/hospitals-the-cost-of-admission-09-06-2013/ (60 Minutes television broadcast on Dec. 2,
2012 that investigated HMA’s clinical practices); Complaint of Plaintiff at 19–20, 24, 27,
United States ex rel. Meyer v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., 0:11-cv-0713-JFA (filed July 15, 2011)
(alleging that HMA benchmarks for ER inpatient admissions were not based on patients’
medical needs, but “were designed to boost hospital admissions rates, irrespective of the
medical needs of the patient population,” with the target ER benchmark admission rates for
both its rural hospital patients and the elderly patient population exceeding national
benchmarks, and that its ER physician protocols less to medically unnecessary tests).
100. See Rosenthal, supra note 83 (stating that physicians who are employees of hospitals
are offered bonuses tied to how much billing they generate, and that such bonuses lead to
the ordering of more tests or services such as X-rays, M.R.I. scans, and physical therapy).
101. Leadership also “stroked and pampered” the physicians in other ways, including
sponsoring a golf tournament to benefit the physicians’ cardiac unit and even use of the
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3. Hospitals’ Resources
Under Medicare’s current payment policies, hospitals profit
when they increase the volume and intensity of care.102 Many
hospital administrators have responded to these incentives by in-
creasing their hospital’s capacity to do more—adding more
inpatient beds, acquiring the latest medical technology, and recruit-
ing more specialists.103 Hospitals have been especially aggressive in
expanding their most profitable lines of services, with many build-
ing “center[s] of excellence” for cardiology, cancer treatment, and
orthopedic and spine surgeries.104 Of course, such efforts would be
futile if physicians did not utilize hospitals’ increased capacity by
admitting more patients or referring patients for more tests and
procedures. Fortunately for hospitals, the Field of Dreams mantra
generally proves true—“if you build it, they will come.”
Researchers have found a strong correlation between treatment
practices among a hospital’s affiliated physicians and the amount
and mix of a hospital’s available resources. The more acute care
beds available at a hospital, the more frequently physicians admit
patients to the hospital.105 Physicians also are more likely to treat
hospital’s emergency helicopter to fly to the golf course. Much of the care provided by the
two physicians was allegedly unnecessary. See BROWNLEE, supra note 88, at 87 (describing the
ways in which Redding Medical Center and its parent company, Tenet Healthcare, rewarded
Drs. Moon and Realvasquez).
102. See infra Part III.A (describing Medicare’s prospective payment methodology).
103. Kelly J. Devers, et al., Changes in Hospital Competitive Strategy: A New Medical Arms
Race?, 38 HEALTH SERV. RES. 447, 456–62 (2003) (describing how in response to weaker man-
aged care incentives hospitals redirected their efforts “toward the addition or expansion of
services attractive to individual physician and patients,” particularly inpatient and outpatient
specialty services such as cardiology, oncology, and orthopedics); Cara S. Lesser, et al., Initial
Findings from HSC’s 2005 Site Visits: Stage Set for Growing Health Care Cost and Access Problems,
CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, Aug. 2005, at 1 (“Hospitals . . . are competing more
broadly and intensely for profitable specialty services, making costly investments to expand
capacity and offer the latest medical technologies . . . .”); Cara S. Lesser, et al., The End of an
Era: What Became of the “Managed Care Revolution” in 2001, 38 HEALTH SERV. RES. 337, 347
(2003) (stating that in response to a weakening of managed care, hospitals responded by
focusing “on expanding services and capacity”).
104. See generally Robert A. Berenson et al., Specialty-Service Lines: Salvos In the New Medical
Arms Race, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS w337, w337–40 (2006) (stating that under fee-for-service, hos-
pitals adopted strategies dedicated to increasing the flow of patients to their hospitals that
resulted in a “medical arms race,” including establishing marketing specialty-services such as
heart institutes, cancer centers, and orthopedic hospitals). See BERENSON & DOCTEUR, supra
note 20; see also Paul B. Ginsberg & Joy M. Grossman, When the Price Isn’t Right: How Inadvertent
Payment Incentives Drive Medicare Care, HEALTH AFFAIRS w5-376 (2005) (explaining that hospi-
tals and physicians are expanding their capacity to deliver those lines of service that are most
profitable under current payment mechanisms).
105. See WENNBERG ET AL., supra note 22, at 39, 46–49, 52 (describing the association
between available resources and clinical decision-making). Although a possible explanation
for the positive relationship between supply and utilization may be that regions with sicker
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patients in intensive care units (ICUs) when a hospital has more
ICU beds.106 The availability of newer, faster, and more sophisti-
cated imaging machines leads physicians to order more radiological
images.107 Similarly, an increase in the availability of catheterization
laboratories leads to patients receiving angioplasty and bypass sur-
gery at higher rates.108 Likewise, when hospital systems recruit or
employ more specialists, patients see specialists more frequently
and receive more tests and procedures than patients in hospital sys-
tems oriented to primary care.109
As these studies demonstrate, physicians adapt their practices to
available resources.110 The more resources available, the more phy-
sicians do for their patients. Relatedly, when hospitals invest in
patients acquire more medical resources because their patients require more care, research-
ers at the Dartmouth Atlas Project found that the prevalence and severity of illness accounts
for remarkably little of the variation in utilization rates across hospital regions. See id. at 9.
106. See id. at 39, 46–49, 52 (describing the association between available resources and
clinical decision-making). The availability of ICU beds also may impact the intensity of end-
of-life care. For example, a study of two academic centers found that the “resource-rich”
hospital that had a 1:4 ratio of ICU-to-ward bed ratio treated patients more aggressively and
had a default norm of “survival to discharge,” whereas the second academic medical center
with a 1:9 ICU ratio had a norm of counseling families to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
when treatment goals such as organ function recovery were not met. See Amber E. Barnato et
al., Norms of Decision Making in the ICU: A Case Study of Two Academic Medical Centers at the
Extremes of End-of-life Treatment Intensity, 38 INTENSIVE CARE MED. 1886 (2012) (comparing the
treatment norms governing end-of-life care at two academic medical centers).
107. See Laurence Baker et al., The Relationship Between Technology Availability and Health
Care Spending, HEALTH AFFAIRS w3-537, w3-542 (2003) (finding that greater availability of
MRIs and CT units is associated with higher use and more spending). Cf. BROWNLEE, supra
note 88, at 161–63 (summarizing the comments of a hospital’s chair of radiology, who stated
that the availability of newer, faster machines “encourages physician to perform even more
unnecessary tests,” thereby bolstering the hospital’s revenue).
108. See Baker, supra note 107, at w3-542–53 (finding that increases in the availability of
cardiac catheterization labs are associated with increases in cardiac catheterization use and
spending). Both coronary angioplasties and heart bypass surgeries are treatments for blocked
arteries. Coronary angioplasties, also called percutaneous coronary interventions, involves
temporarily inserting and inflating a balloon to help widen a clogged artery. See Coronary
Angioplasty and Stents, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/angi-
oplasty/basics/definition/prc-20014401. During heart bypass surgery, a blood vessel is
removed or redirected from one area of the body and placed around the blocked area in
order to restore blood flow to the heart. See Heart Disease and Heart Bypass Surgery, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/heart-disease/guide/heart-disease-bypass-surgery.
109. See Wennberg, supra note 22, at 39, 52–53 (describing the association between availa-
ble resources and clinical decision-making); see also BROWNLEE, supra note 88, at 62–63
(stating that patients in hospital regions with more specialists per capita are referred to spe-
cialists more often, which in turn leads to more tests and procedures).
110. Why physicians’ treatment decisions are influenced by the supply of medical re-
sources or specialists remains unclear. Some commentators believe that when clinical
resources or specialists are readily available, this “lowers the barrier” for hospitalizing pa-
tients, ordering more tests and procedures, or referring patients to a specialist. See
BROWNLEE, supra note 88, at 113, 163, 208 (stating that when hospitals buy faster imaging
machines, “it lowers the barrier for physicians to order yet another unnecessary test”; that
putting “a not-so-sick patient” in a hospital bed when “there is sufficient room to do so”
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resources that support specialized, technology-driven care, physi-
cians provide their patients higher intensity care. Hospital
administrators thereby contribute to a culture of overtreatment
when they expand their hospital’s capacity, especially its capacity to
provide high-intensity care.
B. The Influence of Physicians’ Organizational Peers
Organizational role models and peers also strongly influence in-
dividuals’ norms, values, attitudes, and behavior.111 Physicians are
no different, with commentators long observing that an individual
physician’s clinical decisions generally reflect the practice style and
philosophy of her colleagues.112 As I have explained in previous
work, there are several reasons why physicians hold sway over one
another, particularly in situations of clinical uncertainty. Adopting
the practices of role models or peers provides reassurance that the
physician chose the correct course of treatment.113 In addition, fol-
lowing the clinical practices of others takes less time and effort than
independently evaluating treatment alternatives.114 Physicians also
requires less “time and trouble” for the referring physician than caring for the patient in
other settings; and that “a readily available catheterization laboratory also lowers the barrier
for other doctors to refer patients to an interventional cardiologist for an angiogram, be-
cause they know the patients won’t have to wait weeks or months to get an appointment”).
Physicians also may be subconsciously motivated to utilize available resources in order to
bolster their hospital’s financial position. As I have explained elsewhere, over time, individual
members of an organization come to identify with the organization, which in turn generates
loyalty to the organization and internalization of the organization’s goals as one’s own. See
Mantel, supra note 45, at 493–94. Physicians therefore may be subconsciously motivated to
bolster a hospital’s revenues by filling its beds, sending patients to its catheterization labora-
tory, ordering more imaging procedures, and keeping its specialists busy. Using the available
resources also may further the physician’s self-interest. For example, interventional cardiolo-
gists may appreciate that if the hospital’s catheterization laboratory sits empty, the hospital
will shut it down, denying the interventional cardiologists access to the equipment and other
resources essential to their practices. Consequently, when hospitals expand their capacity,
physicians may be cognitively motivated to clinically justify doing more for patients rather
than less. See generally supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (explaining how physicians’
self-interest subconsciously impacts their clinical judgment).
111. See generally Dallas, supra note 77.
112. See, e.g., Catherine Borbas et al., The Role of Clinical Opinion Leaders in Guideline Imple-
mentation and Quality Improvement, TRANSLATING GUIDELINES INTO PRACTICE, 24S, 26S (2000)
(noting that interpersonal relationships among physicians are the most important facts in
determining physicians’ adoption of medical innovations and refinements of medical prac-
tice, with local, informal medical opinion particularly important); Rita Mano-Negrin & Brian
Mittman, Theorizing the Social within Physician Decision Making, 15 J. MGMT. MED. 259, 261
(2001) (discussing the importance of peer influences on physician behavior).
113. See Mantel, supra note 45, at 491–93 (explaining why physicians model their peers,
including role models).
114. Id.
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may hope that by modeling clinical leaders, they can obtain for
themselves similar prestige and professional advancement. Finally,
physicians may conform to group norms in order to secure others’
approval.115 For example, in a survey of cardiologists, some physi-
cians acknowledged having ordered cardiac catheterizations that
were not clinically indicated in order to meet peer expectations.116
Emerging empirical research demonstrates the effect of organi-
zational peers on physicians’ treatment. A physician’s propensity to
perform a procedure increases as others with admitting privileges at
the same hospital increasingly perform the procedure.117 For exam-
ple, a study of surgeons affiliated with a multi-hospital system found
that surgeons’ use of blood products in cardiac operations varied
widely across facilities, but surgeons practicing at the same hospital
had similar blood transfusion rates.118 In fact, the study’s authors
estimated that only thirty percent of the variation among surgeons
could be explained by differences among individual surgeons, with
seventy percent of the variance explained by the influence of hospital
culture.119 Studies looking at physician drug prescribing practices
have likewise found that the likelihood of a physician prescribing a
new drug increases as a physician’s workplace colleagues increas-
ingly prescribe the drug.120
Studies of physicians who admit patients to two or more hospitals
similarly show the effect of organizational culture on treatment
practices. Among those physicians who admit patients to two or
more hospitals, the number of days a physician keeps a patient in
the hospital generally conforms to the usual practice at the hospital
where the patient is admitted.121 In other words, rather than follow
115. Id.
116. See Frances Lee Lucas et al., Variation in Cardiologists’ Propensity to Test and Treat: Is It
Associated with Regional Variation in Utilization?, 3 CIRCULATION: CARDIOVASCULAR QUALITY &
OUTCOMES 253, 253 (2010) (reporting results of a survey of cardiologists).
117. See Mary A. Burke et al., Geographical Variations in a Model of Physician Treatment Choice
with Social Interactions (Fed. Reserve Bank Bos., Working Paper No. 09-4, 2009) (reporting
results of study comparing a physician’s propensity to perform certain procedures to rates of
use within the physician’s social network).
118. See Ruyun Jin et al., Effect of Hospital Culture on Blood Transfusion in Cardiac Procedures,
95 ANNALS THORACIC SURGERY 1269, 1269 (2013) (surgeons’ use of blood products in cardiac
operations varied widely across the facilities, but surgeons practicing at the same hospital had
similar blood transfusion rates).
119. See id.
120. See Shu-Jou Lin et al., Colleague Interactions and New Drug Prescribing Behavior: The Case
of the Initial Prescription of Antidepressants in Taiwanese Medical Centers, 73 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1208
(2011) (confirming the findings of prior studies showing that the likelihood of a physician
adopting a new drug is influenced by the adoption rate for the drug among the physician’s
colleagues).
121. See Judith D. de Jong et al., Variation in Hospital Length of Stay: Do Physicians Adapt
Their Length of Stay Decisions to What is Usual in the Hospital Where They Work?, 41 HEALTH SERV.
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a consistent practice style across hospitals, a physician admits her
patients for longer periods of time in the hospital with the longer
average length of stay and discharges her patients sooner from the
hospital with the shorter average length of stay even after control-
ling for differences in patient characteristics.122
These studies reveal that physicians do not make clinical deci-
sions in a vacuum, but that hospitals’ organizational cultures shape
physicians’ professional judgments. Over time, institution-specific
patterns of care emerge as individual physicians conform to their
organizational peers’ “way of doing things.”
* * * * *
In sum, hospitals’ organizational cultures play a large role in
shaping physicians’ treatment patterns, including their treatment
of Medicare patients. Far too often these patterns of care reflect a
cultural bias toward overtreatment. Importantly, hospitals’ organi-
zational cultures influence physicians’ judgments not only within
the acute care setting, but also outside the inpatient hospital walls.
For example, the decision whether to admit a Medicare patient for
inpatient care frequently occurs in the physician office. Similarly,
the decision to refer a patient to the hospital’s heart center and the
decision to perform an invasive cardiology procedure all take place
in the outpatient setting.
Reducing the volume and intensity of care provided to Medicare
patients therefore requires a fundamental shift in hospitals’ organi-
zational cultures: a shift from cultures of overtreatment to cultures
of efficiency. Accordingly, a comprehensive regulatory approach
for combatting overtreatment of Medicare patients must encourage
hospitals to address the various ways their cultures promote over-
treatment of patients both inside and outside the hospital setting.
Unfortunately, current Medicare payment policies fail in this task,
as they do too little in holding hospitals accountable for excessive
care.
RES. 374 (2006) (comparing lengths of stays for U.S. physicians admitting patients to two or
more hospitals); see also G.P. Westert et al., Variation in Duration of Hospital Stay Between Hospi-
tals and Between Doctors Within Hospitals, 37 SOC. SCI. & MED. 833 (1993) (similar study looking
at Dutch physicians).
122. Id.
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III. PAST AND PRESENT PAYMENT REFORMS—
AN ORGANIZATIONAL FOCUS
Hospitals’ influence over patterns of care has not escaped policy-
makers’ notice. Particular attention has been given to how hospitals
are paid under Medicare. The hope has been that payment reforms
that reward hospitals for lower utilization would cause hospitals to
pressure physicians to practice in a more cost-conscious manner.123
Although these payment reforms have had some success in slowing
the rate of growth in Medicare spending, the problem of overtreat-
ment continues to plague the Medicare program. This Part
describes current Medicare hospital payment policies, and explains
why they have not addressed hospitals’ cultures of overtreatment.
A. Prospective Payment
Medicare initially paid hospitals their reasonable costs for each
discrete service provided to inpatients.124 Paying hospitals in this
manner rewarded resource-intensive care that kept patients in the
hospital for longer periods of time. Recognizing the inflationary
pressures of reasonable cost reimbursement, in the mid-1980s
Medicare shifted to prospective payment, under which hospitals are
paid a fixed payment for each inpatient admission. Specifically,
under the Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS),
acute care hospitals receive a pre-determined rate for each inpa-
tient admission based on the diagnosis-related group (DRG)
classification.125 To ensure that the costs of treating a Medicare pa-
tient remained below the fixed payment amount, hospitals
123. Phyllis Floyd, Roadmap for Physician Compensation in a Value-Based World, PHYSI-
CANLEADERS.ORG (2014) (stating that as payment models evolve to value-based, risk-sharing
accountable care contracts, current models of compensating physician-employees of hospi-
tals and health systems must shift from one based primarily on productivity to a more
complex model with incentives to “bend the cost curve”); Anna Wilde Mathews, Hospitals
Prescribe Big Data to Track Doctors at Work, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2013, at A1 (stating that in
response to payment changes that place hospitals under pressure to cut costs, hospital ad-
ministrators must “lean on doctors” to provide less costly care); Christopher Moriates, et al.,
Development of a Hospital-Based Program Focused on Improving Healthcare Value, 9 J. HOSP. MED.
671 (2014) (describing the efforts of one hospital to address wasteful practices among its
hospitalist group in response to value-based purchasing programs).
124. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102, § 1814(b), 79 Stat.
303.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(1). Each case is assigned to a DRG based on the Medicare
beneficiary’s principal diagnosis, secondary diagnoses such as comorbidities and complica-
tions, and patient characteristics such as gender and age. 42 C.F.R. § 412.60(c)(1). Each
DRG is assigned a payment weight based on the average resources used to treat Medicare
patients in that DRG relative to patients assigned to other DRGs. 42 U.S.C.
FALL 2015] Spending Medicare’s Dollars Wisely 149
responded to IPPS by discharging patients sooner and, to a lesser
extent, reducing the intensity of care.126 Prospective payment
thereby flipped hospitals’ incentives, with hospitals profiting by do-
ing less rather than more.
Following implementation of IPPS, Congress expanded prospec-
tive payment to other patient care settings, including the outpatient
hospital setting.127 The outpatient prospective payment system
(OPPS) pays hospitals a fixed rate for outpatient services, such as
outpatient surgical procedures or emergency care, based on the
ambulatory payment case (APC) to which the service is assigned.128
Ancillary, supportive, and adjunctive items such as routine supplies
and clinical laboratory services are bundled into the payment for
the primary outpatient service.129
Although prospective payment succeeded in slowing the growth
in Medicare costs,130 its success in reducing overutilization has been
incomplete. Importantly, prospective payment only encourages hos-
pitals and other providers to reduce the cost of treating an episode
of care, such as an inpatient admission; it does not create incentives
to avoid the episode itself.131 For example, IPPS does nothing to
deter admitting Medicare patients with chronic conditions to the
hospital rather than treating them in outpatient settings. Nor does
§ 1395ww(d)(4)(B). The fixed payment rate paid to the hospital is also adjusted for geo-
graphic differences in labor and other costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(4)(B)(ii).
126. See Robert F. Coulam & Gary L. Gaumer, Medicare’s Prospective Payment System: A Criti-
cal Appraisal, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 45 (1992) (summarizing studies finding a decline in the
average length of stay for Medicare patients admitted to the hospital during the year follow-
ing implementation of IPPS as well as a decrease in the intensity of care of certain services);
Frank A. Sloan et al., Medicare Prospective Payment and the Use of Medical Technologies in Hospitals,
26 MED. CARE 837, 837 (1988) (finding a decline in the number of routine tests per inpatient
following implementation of the IPPS).
127. In addition to the inpatient and outpatient hospital settings, Medicare pays for the
following services on a prospective basis: inpatient psychiatric facilities, inpatient rehabilita-
tion facilities, long-term care hospitals, and skilled nursing facilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww(j),
(m), and (s); and 1395yy(d)(1). Home health agencies similarly receive a fixed payment for
each sixty-day episode of care. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(b).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t). Individual services within an APC are clinically similar and simi-
lar in costs. Id. § 1395l(t)(2)(B).
129. As with IPPS payment rates, payments rates under OPPS are adjusted for geographic
differences in labor and other costs. Id. § 1395l(t)(2)(D).
130. See Cristina Boccuti & Marilyn Moon, Comparing Medicare and Private Insurers: Growth
Rates in Spending Over Three Decades, 22 HEALTH AFF. 230, 235 (2003) (finding a “dramatic”
decline in the growth of costs for both Medicare and the private sector following implemen-
tation of IPPS); Chapin White, Why Did Medicare Spending Growth Slow Down?, 27 HEALTH AFF.
793, 796 (2008) (“[T]he implementation of the inpatient PPS coincided with a substantial
and sustained reduction in excess spending growth in Medicare hospital spending.”).
131. Initially some hospitals responded to IPPS by shifting certain services from the inpa-
tient setting to outpatient settings that were not subject to prospective payment. See Coulam
& Gaumer, supra note 126, at 57–58. This strategy, however, became less tenable as Medicare
adopted prospective payment for institutional outpatient settings.
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OPPS deter outpatient services of questionable value, such as ex-
pensive cancer treatments that, at best, offer minimal clinical
benefit. Moreover, because prospective payment reimburses higher
intensity care at higher rates, it encourages providers to select
higher intensity care over lower intensity alternatives.132 Indeed, the
shift to prospective payment led many hospitals to increase their ca-
pacity to provide technology-driven care, as discussed previously.133
Prospective payment thus continues to reward overtreament.
B. Affordable Care Act Reforms
In recognition of the failures of prospective payment, the ACA
ushered in a new era in Medicare payment policy. This Subpart dis-
cusses three payment reforms enacted under ACA—the Hospital
Value-Based Purchasing Program, the Bundled Payments for Care
Improvement Initiative, and the Shared Savings Program.
1. Hospital Value-Based Purchasing
Under Medicare’s Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Pro-
gram, hospitals performing well on selected measures enjoy higher
Medicare reimbursement rates under IPPS, while those performing
poorly face downward adjustments in their reimbursement rates.134
132. Under the IPPS, each DRG is assigned a payment weight based on the average re-
sources used to treat Medicare patients in that DRG relative to patients assigned to other
DRGs. See id. Consequently, if higher than average resources are used to treat patients within
a particular DRG, the DRG is assigned a higher weight, resulting in higher payments for
patients assigned to that DRG. Moreover, as hospitals adopt a new technology for the treat-
ment of patients assigned to a DRG, overtime the DRG’s relative weight will reflect the higher
costs associated with the new technology. Similarly, because the OPPS assigns individual ser-
vices in an APC in part based on costs, see 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(2)(D), using a new technology
will lead to a service being assigned to a higher-paying APC. Hospitals also have continued to
adopt new technology in an effort to attract physicians away from competing hospitals. See
Bagley, supra note 28, at 542 (discussing hospitals adoption of new technology). Conse-
quently, prospective payment failed to put the brakes on providers adopting new technology
that may be of limited value.
133. See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text.
134. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 3001(a), 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)). The Hospital VBP Pro-
gram began in October of 2012. Hospitals performing poorly had their payment rates for
inpatient acute care services reduced by up to 1.0 percent, with the percentage reduction
gradually increasing to 2.0 percent for fiscal year 2017. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(7)(C).
Other so-called value based purchasing programs that link hospitals’ payments to out-
comes include the Medicare Readmission Reductions Program and the Medicare Hospital-
Acquired Condition Reductions Program. The Medicare Readmission Reductions Program
reduces inpatient payments to hospitals with a high rate of discharged patients re-admitted to
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The initial VBP measures focused on the quality of care provided to
hospital inpatients, rather than efficiency considerations. For exam-
ple, for fiscal year 2014, over half of the measures evaluated how
often a hospital delivered a specific clinical service at a specific
point in time,135 such as the percentage of Acute Myocardial Infarc-
tion (AMI) (or heart attack) patients receiving fibrinolytic
medication within thirty minutes of arriving at the hospital.136
Other quality measures evaluate hospitals’ clinical outcomes, such
as the thirty-day mortality rate for patients with a heart attack, heart
failure, or pneumonia diagnosis,137 or patients’ perspective on the
quality of care received.138 The Hospital VBP Program thereby en-
courages hospitals to improve the quality of care delivered to
inpatients, as doing so will raise their IPPS payments.
Improving the quality of inpatient care also can lead to efficiency
gains by preventing costly complications and hospital readmis-
sions.139 The hospital VBP quality measures, however, do little to
reduce overutilization of medically unnecessary or excessive care.
For example, measures evaluating whether surgical patients receive
appropriate care immediately before or after surgery do not ad-
dress whether the surgery itself was appropriate. Nor do VBP
measures assessing hospital inpatients’ satisfaction with their care
assess whether their admission to the hospital was warranted in the
first place.
the hospital. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 3025, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)). The Medicare Hospital-Acquired Con-
dition Reductions Program reduces inpatient payments to the lowest-performing quartile of
hospitals with regard to hospital-acquired conditions (i.e., conditions that patients did not
have upon admission to the hospitals but developed during the hospital stay). Id. § 3008
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395www(p)).
135. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Total Performance Score Information,
MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/HospitalCompare/Data/total-performance-scores
.html (listing the three domains that comprise hospitals’ Total Performance Score).
136. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Clinical Process of Care Domain, MEDICARE.
GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/HospitalCompare/Data/Clinical-Process-of-Care.html (list-
ing the performance measures comprising the clinical process of care domain).
137. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Outcome Domain, MEDICARE.GOV, http://
www.medicare.gov/HospitalCompare/Data/outcome-domain.html (listing the performance
measures comprising the outcome domain).
138. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Patient Experience of Care Domain, MEDICARE.
GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/HospitalCompare/Data/Patient-Experience-Domain.html
(listing the eight performance measures comprising the patient experience of care domain).
For example, the patient experience of care measures include the percentage of patients
reporting that their nurses “always” communicated well and the percentage of patients re-
porting that hospital staff were “always” responsive to their needs.
139. See Richard F. Averill et al., Achieving Cost Control, Care Coordination and Quality Im-
provement Through Incremental Payment System Reform, 33 J. AMBULATORY CARE MGMT. 2, 10
(2009) (“For inpatient care, the 2 most significant manifestations of poor quality that in-
crease payment are postadmission complications and readmissions.”).
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Recognizing that quality measures are of limited value in target-
ing overtreatment, CMS has turned its attention to measures that
evaluate a hospital’s efficiency. For fiscal year 2015, the Hospital
VBP Program will include a new efficiency measure that compares a
hospital’s overall efficiency relative to the median hospital—the
Medicare Spending per Beneficiary (MSPB) measure.140 The MSPB
measure captures Medicare-covered services performed by the hos-
pital and other providers141 for the period beginning three days
before an inpatient admission through thirty days after the patient
is discharged.142 Hospitals with lower per capita costs receive higher
efficiency scores, while those with higher per capita costs may re-
ceive lower efficiency scores.143 For fiscal year 2015, twenty percent
of a hospital’s overall VBP score will be based on the MSPB mea-
sure, with the remaining eighty percent based on its performance
140. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEASURE INFORMATION FORM COLLECTED
FOR: CMS EFFICIENCY MEASURES (CLAIMS BASED), https://www.qualitynet.org/dcs/Content-
Server?pagename=QnetPublic/Search/SearchResults&keywords=MSPB&rowNum=11
(Medicare Spending Per Beneficiary, 1) [hereinafter MEASURE INFORMATION FORM] (explain-
ing the MSPB measure).
141. The MSPB measure captures all Medicare Part A and Part B claims provided to the
relevant time period, but excludes Part D claims. See id. at 2.
142. See id. CMS has explained that the MSPB measure includes care provided during the
thirty days post-discharge because variations in practice patterns post-discharge often reflect
differences in hospitals’ practices during the inpatient stay and the transition to non-inpa-
tient settings. See id. at 1, 3 (explaining the rationale for including the time period thirty days
post-discharge).
To calculate a hospital’s MSBP score, CMS first standardizes Medicare payments by elimi-
nating geographic payment adjustments and payments to hospitals for graduate indirect
medical education (IME) and for serving a disproportionate population of poor and unin-
sured (i.e., disproportionate share hospital payments) (DSH)). See id. at 3 (explaining CMS’s
price standardization methodology). CMS then sums the payment-standardized costs for all
claims submitted to Medicare, beginning three days before the inpatient admission and end-
ing thirty days after discharge. CMS next adjusts this amount to account for differences in
patients’ risk factors by dividing the aggregate costs by the sum of the expected costs from
the risk-adjustment model. This ratio is then multiplied by the national average MSPB epi-
sode cost for all hospitals to determine the “MSPB amount at the hospital level.” The
individual hospital’s MSPB amount is then divided by the national medical MSPB amount to
determine a ratio, or percentage, which is the hospital’s MSPB measure rate. See Medicare
Program: Revisions to Payment Policies under the Physician Fee Schedule & Other Revisions
to Part B for CY 2014, 78 Fed. Reg. 43282, 43494 (July 19, 2013) [hereinafter Revisions to
Payment Policies III] (describing CMS’s calculation of hospitals’ MSPB measure rate).
143. A hospital’s efficiency score is based on the higher of its achievement score or im-
provement score. The achievement score is based on the hospital’s performance on the
MSBP measure as compared to other hospitals, and its improvement score is based on to the
extent to which a hospital improves its performance on the MSBP measure over its prior
performance. Accordingly, hospitals that have lower per capita costs will have higher achieve-
ment scores, which translates into higher efficiency scores. Hospitals with higher per capita
costs will have lower achievement scores, and thus lower efficiency scores absent significant
improvement over their past performance. See Hospital Value-Based Purchasing, MEDICARE.GOV,
https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/data/hospital-vbp.html.
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on the VBP quality measures.144 Inefficient hospitals thus may be
penalized with lower reimbursement rates.
CMS also invited public input on whether to adopt additional
efficiency measures that would evaluate hospitals’ success in con-
trolling costs for six specific conditions: (1) kidney/urinary tract
infection, (2) cellulitis, (3) gastrointestinal hemorrhage, (4) hip re-
placement/revision, (5) knee replacement/revision, and (6)
lumbar spine fusion/refusion.145 These episode-based efficiency
measures would capture Medicare-covered services provided by the
hospital and other providers for the period beginning three days
before an inpatient admission through thirty days following dis-
charge, but would be limited to those services clinically related to
the specified health condition.146 For example, the kidney/urinary
tract infection measure would be based on the average cost of all
care provided to a hospital’s patients for treatment of a kidney/
urinary tract infection. Hospitals with lower per capita costs for the
selected conditions would receive higher efficiency scores, while
those with higher per capita costs would receive lower efficiency
scores.
The inclusion of efficiency measures under the Hospital VBP
Program is an important step in giving hospitals financial incentives
to address overtreatment. Yet the MSBP measure and episode-based
measures suggested by CMS have significant shortcomings. First, be-
cause these measures are triggered by an inpatient admission, they
do not create incentives to avoid the initial hospitalization.147 For
example, a measure evaluating a hospital’s efficiency in caring for
patients receiving a lumbar spine fusion would not address overu-
tilization of the surgical procedure itself.148 Second, because the
time period captured by the MSBP measure and proposed episode-
based measures is limited to three days before hospitalization and
144. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FACT SHEET: UNDERSTANDING THE FISCAL
YEAR (FY) 2015 HOSPITAL VALUE-BASED PURCHASING (VBP) PERCENTAGE PAYMENT SUMMARY
REPORT 2 (July 2014), https://www.qualitynet.org/dcs/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=
QnetPublic%2FPage%2FQnetBasic&cid=1228774324777 (explaining the methodology for
calculating hospitals’ VBP scores).
145. See Medicare Program: Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems, 79 Fed. Reg.
27978, 28122–23 (May 15, 2014) [hereinafter Hospital IPPS] (discussing the possibility of
adding new episode-based payment measures to the Hospital VBP program).
146. See id.
147. See Peter S. Hussey et al., Episode-Based Performance Measurement and Payment: Making it
a Reality, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1406, 1412 (2009) (commenting that hospital-based episodes “do
not create an incentive to avoid the initial hospitalization, since episodes are based around
admissions”).
148. Experts contend that orthopedic surgeons are performing too many lumbar spine
refusion surgeries on patients with chronic back pain. See, e.g., Richard A. Deyo et al., Spinal-
Fusion Surgery—The Case for Restraint, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 722 (2004).
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thirty days after discharge, the measures do not capture excessive
outpatient care provided outside this window. As discussed previ-
ously, however, hospitals may subtly encourage their affiliated
physicians to perform certain outpatient procedures at excessive
rates, such as by building centers of excellence or subsidizing the
purchase of costly technology used in the outpatient setting.149 At
best, then, the current Hospital VBP Program serves as a partial and
imperfect tool for addressing hospitals’ cultures of overtreatment.
2. Bundled Payments and Shared Savings
Medicare’s Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative
(“Bundled Payments Program”) and Shared Savings Program also
depart from the fee-for-service model of paying providers separately
for each unit of care provided. CMS established the Bundled Pay-
ments Program under its new authority “to test innovative payment
and service delivery models to reduce program expendi-
tures . . . .”150 The initiative tests four bundled payment models that
jointly pay providers for a defined set of services, known as an epi-
sode of care.151 For example, under the fourth model, CMS makes a
single bundled payment to a hospital for all care provided to a pa-
tient by the hospital, physicians, and other practitioners during an
inpatient stay and any related readmission within thirty days of the
initial discharge.152 Providers profit when the cost of treating an epi-
sode of care falls below the bundled payment amount. Bundled
payments thereby encourage more cost-conscious care.
Despite the promise of bundled payments to deter overtreat-
ment, the Bundled Payments Program as currently designed has
significant deficiencies. Under each of the four payment models, an
episode of care is triggered by an inpatient admission.153 Like the
149. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
150. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 3021,
§ 1115(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1316(a)).
151. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FACT SHEETS: BUNDLED PAYMENTS FOR
CARE IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVE (Jan. 31, 2013) [hereinafter FACT SHEETS: BUNDLED PAYMENTS]
(providing an overview of the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative). The four
different bundled payment models vary by the types of health care providers involved and the
services included in the bundle. See id.
152. See id.
153. The first model defining an episode of care as an inpatient admission, the second
defining an episode as the inpatient admission plus thirty, sixty, or ninety days after dis-
charge, the third defining an episode as thirty, sixty, or ninety days after discharge, and the
final model defining an episode as the inpatient admission plus any related readmissions
within thirty days after discharge. See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
CMS Announces New Initiative to Improve Care and Reduce Costs for Medicare (Jan. 31,
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Hospital VBP Program, the Bundled Payment Program does not de-
ter unnecessary or excessive hospital admissions. Nor do the four
bundled payment models address overtreatment of patients never
admitted as inpatients. All four payment models also narrowly de-
fine the relevant time periods for an episode of care, capping the
timeframe at ninety days after discharge.154 Consequently, the pay-
ment models do not reach excessive outpatient care provided
outside these narrowly defined episodes. Finally, the Bundled Pay-
ments Program has limited reach, as it is a voluntary program
restricted to approximately five hundred organizations.155 The vast
majority of hospitals thus do not participate in the program.156
The ACA also launched the Medicare Shared Savings Program.157
Under the Medicare Shared Savings Program, hospitals participat-
ing in accountable care organizations (ACOs)158 that successfully
lower the aggregate annual cost of caring for their Medicare pa-
tients receive a percentage of the savings, provided the ACO also
satisfies certain quality metrics.159 After completing their initial




155. See id. “Organizations” includes institutions other than hospitals, such as physicians’
groups. Id.
156. See id; see also Fast Facts on US Hospitals, AM. HEALTH ASS’N (2015), http://www.aha.
org/research/rc/stat-studies/fast-facts.shtml (noting that there are 4,974 community hospi-
tals in the United States, not including Veterans Administration hospitals, prison hospitals
and acute care facilities like psychiatric hospitals).
157. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 3022, § 1899,
124 Stat. 119 (2010).
158. ACOs are local organizations comprised of primary care physicians and also may
include specialists, hospitals, and/or other providers. Providers participating in an ACO
agree to be jointly accountable for the cost and quality of care delivered to a patient popula-
tion. See Boland, supra note 9, at 12 (“An ACO is generally defined as a local health care
organization with a network of providers such as primary care physicians, specialists, and
hospitals that are accountable for the cost and quality of care delivered to a particular
population.”).
159. Under the shared savings payment model, the ACO continues to receive fee-for-
service based payments, but Medicare also rewards an ACO that meets or exceeds its targeted
cost savings with a bonus equal to a percentage of the savings. See Medicare Program; Medi-
care Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg.
67,802, 67,927 (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-02/pdf/2011-
27461.pdf [hereinafter Medicare Shared Savings Program]. The Shared Savings Program
also includes economic incentives for ACOs to improve quality by tying a portion of an
ACO’s reimbursement to its performance on quality benchmarks. For example, an ACO that
performs poorly on the relevant quality measures may be ineligible for any bonus payment
under the shared savings or shared savings and risk payment models, even if the ACO lowers
the cost of care. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.100(b) (2012) (stating that ACOs participating in the
Medicare shared savings program are eligible for shared savings only if they meet the mini-
mum quality performance standards, among other requirements).
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an ACO will continue to receive a percentage of any Medicare sav-
ings, but also will be penalized with a downward adjustment in their
Medicare reimbursement rates if the ACO does not meet targeted
cost savings.160 CMS has stated that in the future it may pay ACOs
on a capitated basis, with participating organizations receiving a sin-
gle payment for each Medicare patient under their care.161
The Shared Savings Program avoids many of the pitfalls of pro-
spective payment, the Hospital VBP Program, and the Bundled
Payments Program. Importantly, the Shared Savings Program bases
bonuses and penalties on the cost of all care provided to Medicare
beneficiaries across all patient settings for the entire year.162 By ty-
ing hospital and other ACO participants’ incomes to the total
annual resources used to treat their patient population, the Shared
Savings Program encourages ACO providers to care for their pa-
tients in the most efficient manner possible. For example, the
program deters admitting to the hospital patients that could be ef-
fectively treated in the outpatient setting. Similarly, it discourages
costly procedures that are no better than less expensive alternatives.
Unfortunately, the voluntary nature of the Shared Savings Program
has hampered its effectiveness as a tool against overtreatment, as
most hospitals are not participating in the program.163
160. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.100(c). ACOs also may elect to enroll in the shared savings and
risk model during their initial term. See Medicare Shared Savings Program, supra note 159, at
67,904.
161. See Medicare Shared Savings Program, supra note 159, at 67,805 (discussing the pos-
sibility of CMS in the future paying ACOs based on a capitation payment model). In addition
to the Shared Savings Program, CMS has established the Pioneer ACO Model (Pioneer Pro-
gram) for organizations with experience operating as ACOs. Under this program,
participating ACOs will receive higher levels of reward and assume greater financial risk than
ACOs participating in the Shared Savings Program. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., PIONEER ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATION MODEL: GENERAL FACT SHEET (2011),
http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Pioneer-ACO-Model/PioneerACO-FactSheet.html. In
addition, in year three of the Pioneer Program, CMS will begin testing a capitated payment
model, with eligible ACOs receiving a monthly per-beneficiary amount in lieu of part or all of
the ACO’s fee-for-service payments. See id.
162. In calculating the savings to the Medicare program, if any, generated by the ACO,
CMS estimates the ACO’s average per capita Medicare expenditures for its Medicare benefi-
ciaries and compares this to the ACO’s benchmark per capita Medicare expenditures. This
calculation considers all services provided to the beneficiary for the performance year that
are covered under Medicare Parts A and B, regardless of whether provided by the ACO or
another provider. 42 C.F.R. §§ 425.604, 425.606 (setting for the rules for calculating savings
under the one-sided and two-sided models).
163. In 2014, 338 ACOs participated in the Shared Savings Program, with an additional
twenty-three ACOs participating in the Pioneer Program. Collectively these ACOs provide
care to 5.6 million Medicare beneficiaries. Among the 338 ACOs participating in the Shared
Savings Program, thirty percent reported that they were hospitals/professional partnerships
and nineteen percent were hospitals employing physicians. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., FAST FACTS: ALL MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM AND MEDICARE PIONEER ACOS 1
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In theory, the current limitations of the Bundled Payment and
Shared Savings Programs could be removed. The Bundled Payment
Program could define episodes of care more broadly to capture
longer time periods and all outpatient care. Congress also could
mandate that hospitals and other providers participate in the Bun-
dled Payment Program or Shared Savings Program. In practice,
however, mandatory participation in these programs would be un-
wise at this time because many providers have yet to achieve the
administrative and operational infrastructure necessary for success
under these programs.
Before accepting bundled payments or shared savings/losses,
hospitals and their affiliated providers must be capable both of
managing the associated financial operations and coordinating care
across care settings. Hospitals and affiliated providers must agree
on how to allocate the bundled payments, shared savings, and
shared losses.164 They also must identify an entity capable of acting
as a third-party administrator—collecting the bundled payments
and shared savings; distributing payments among participating
providers; and identifying patients’ clinical needs.165 In addition,
participating providers must “break down provider silos”166 and “es-
tablish linkages”167 that allow them to efficiently deliver high quality
care.168 Finally, participating providers must be capable of assuming
the financial risk inherent in the Bundled Payments and Shared
Savings Programs.169 Unfortunately, at present many hospitals and
(Apr. 2015), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsav-
ingsprogram/Downloads/PioneersMSSPCombinedFastFacts.pdf. Participation in the Shared
Savings Program continues to grow, as CMS has announced that in 2015, 424 ACOs serving
over 7.8 million beneficiaries will participate in the Shared Savings and Pioneer Programs. See
ACOs Moving Ahead, THE CMS BLOG (Dec. 22, 2014), http://blog.cms.gov/2014/12/.
164. See Cheryl L. Damberg et al., Exploring Episode-Based Approaches for Medicare Perform-
ance Measurement, Accountability and Payment 9 (HHS Working Paper, Feb. 2009) (noting the
challenge of how to divide bundled payments among multiple providers); AM. HOSP. ASS’N
COMM. ON RESEARCH, BUNDLED PAYMENT: AHA RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT 9–10 (2010)
(same).
165. See AM. HOSP. ASS’N COMM. ON RESEARCH, supra note 164, at 10 (describing the ad-
ministrative challenges of bundled payments).
166. BERENSON AND DOCTEUR, supra note 20, at 8.
167. AM. HOSP. ASS’ COMM. ON RESEARCH, supra note 164, at 9.
168. See id. at 10 (stating that there must be an entity that can undertake the function of
care coordination, that is an entity that can work effectively with all participating providers
and hold them accountable for the quality and cost of care provided).
169. See Peter S. Hussey et al., The Prometheus Bundled Payment Experiment: Slow Start Shows
Problems in Implementing New Payment Models, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2116, 2188 (2011) (noting con-
cerns that providers accepting bundled payments “will not be capable of managing the
increased financial risk or reducing care costs for their patient populations”). In contrast to
fee-for-service, where the insurer bears the financial risk of costly care, bundled payments
and shared risk shifts some or all of this financial risk to providers.
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their affiliated physicians are not yet ready to undertake these func-
tions, as they lack the necessary infrastructure and collaborative
relationships.170
In the near term, then, reformers should focus on making incre-
mental changes to Medicare payment policy that would encourage
hospitals and other providers to build the infrastructure that would
support their assuming financial risk under bundled payment or
shared savings payment arrangements.171 Part IV therefore pro-
poses a new, transitional payment policy that would accomplish this
goal while encouraging providers to reduce their overtreatment of
Medicare patients.
IV. REGULATING OVERTREATMENT THROUGH THE HOSPITAL VALUE
BASED PURCHASING PROGRAM
As discussed above, the Medicare payment system must evolve
from one that rewards the provision of high volume, high intensity
care to one that rewards efficient care. Incorporating efficiency
measures under the Hospital VBP Program is an important step in
that direction, but in its current form the program does too little to
deter the overtreatment of patients outside the acute care setting.
This Part therefore sets forth a proposal that would rectify this defi-
ciency—adopting under the Hospital VBP Program efficiency
measures based on broadly defined episodes of care. The proposal
also includes safeguards that would protect Medicare patients from
undertreatment and suggests a process for resolving complex tech-
nical issues before full implementation of the new efficiency
measures.
A. Linking Hospital’s Payments to Broadly Defined Episode-Based
Efficiency Measures
As discussed in Part III.B.1, the Hospital VBP Program rewards
hospitals that perform well on selected quality and efficiency mea-
sures with higher payments for inpatient care, while lower
170. See AM. HOSP. ASS’N COMM. ON RESEARCH, supra note 164, at 10 (commenting that
few health care entities “have the infrastructure and influence to undertake” the functions
necessary for accepting bundled payments); Damberg et al., supra note 164, at 72 (comment-
ing that a “significant barrier” to accountable entities such as ACOs is the lack of integration
between group members).
171. See generally Damberg et al., supra note 164 (discussing the merits of a building block
approach to payment reform).
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performing hospitals are penalized with lower payments. The pro-
gram presently includes a single efficiency measure, the MSPB
measure, although CMS has invited public input on six condition-
specific efficiency measures.172 For the reasons noted previously,
these measures are of limited effectiveness in deterring overtreat-
ment, as they are built around inpatient admissions and a narrowly
defined timeframe. Consequently, they create no incentive for hos-
pitals and their affiliated physicians to avoid the initial
hospitalization; nor do they curb excessive ambulatory care pro-
vided outside the measures’ narrow time window.173
These defects can be remedied by incorporating into the Hospi-
tal VBP Program broadly defined episode-based efficiency measures
built around specific medical conditions. Like the six episode-based
measures suggested by CMS, broadly defined episode-based effi-
ciency measures would compare the relative efficiency of hospitals
and their affiliated physicians in treating patients with particular
conditions. Hospitals with higher-than-average costs in treating the
selected conditions would score poorly on the measures, while
those with less-than-average costs would score higher. However,
under my proposal, the episode-based efficiency measures would
differ from the six episode measures proposed by CMS in two im-
portant respects.
First, the selected episodes would not necessarily require a hospi-
talization, but instead would be triggered by the patient having the
selected condition. In other words, patients attributed to a hospital
would include both patients with the condition that are admitted to
the hospital and those with the condition treated entirely on an
outpatient basis.174 For example, an efficiency measure for heart
disease would include the cost of treating patients with heart dis-
ease who are hospitalized and those who are not. Because inpatient
care typically costs more than outpatient care, hospitals whose affili-
ated physicians regularly treat patients in the inpatient setting
would have higher per capita costs for the selected conditions than
hospitals whose physicians favor the outpatient setting. Conse-
quently, hospitals with cultures that encourage unwarranted
inpatient admissions would score poorly on the episode-based effi-
ciency measures.
Second, the selected episodes would include all related care pro-
vided to patients over an extended period of time (e.g., six months
172. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
173. See supra Part III.B.1.
174. See infra note 205 for a discussion of possible methodologies for attributing patients
to a particular hospital.
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or one year), rather than ending thirty days after a patient’s dis-
charge from the hospital.175 For example, a measure for heart
attack that captures all related care for a one year period would
include not only the emergency room and inpatient care provided
at the condition’s onset but also all follow-up care provided during
the one year period. The measure thus would capture the invasive
cardiology procedures often performed on heart attack patients
during the months following their discharge.176 Because the effi-
ciency measures would include care provided over an extended
period of time across all patient care settings, hospitals whose affili-
ated physicians provide a high volume and intensity of care both
inside and outside the acute care setting would have higher per cap-
ita costs under the selected measures.
Unlike the current Hospital VBP program, this Article’s proposal
recognizes the far-reaching influence of hospitals’ organizational
cultures beyond the acute care setting. In capturing a wide range of
services, broad episode-based efficiency measures provide a com-
prehensive picture of the volume and intensity of services provided
by a hospital and its affiliated physicians across all patient care settings.
Hospitals with a culture of overtreatment would have higher per
capita costs for the selected conditions, and thus would have lower
VBP efficiency scores. As a result, hospitals with a culture of over-
treatment would be paid less under Medicare than their more
efficient counterparts. My proposal thereby holds a hospital ac-
countable when its organizational culture leads to excessive care
both inside and outside the acute care setting.
To illustrate, contrast the narrow lumbar spine fusion/refusion
episode measure suggested by CMS with a broader episode-based
efficiency measure for chronic lower back pain. Providers caring for
patients with chronic back pain employ a wide range of high-tech
and low-tech treatment options across patient care settings, includ-
ing bed rest, drug therapy, physical therapy, chiropractic care,
steroid injections, transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation, spi-
nal fusion surgery, and other forms of surgery.177 The lumbar spine
175. See Revisions to Payment Policies III, supra note 142, at 43502 (explaining episodes
of care).
176. See generally NATIONAL QUALITY FORUM, ENDORSING COST AND RESOURCE USE MEA-
SURES: TECHNICAL REPORT 4 (2014) (explaining episodes built around acute illnesses).
177. See Low Back Pain Fact Sheet, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Dec. 2014), http://www.ninds.
nih.gov/disorders/backpain/detail_backpain.htm (describing the available treatments for
chronic lower back pain). There is wide variation in the care provided to patients with
chronic back pain that is not explained by differences in patient characteristics and co-mor-
bidities. See THE DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH POL’Y & CLINICAL PRACTICE, supra note 11
(reporting regional variation in the treatment of chronic back pain not explained by patient
needs or preferences).
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fusion/refusion episode measure proposed by CMS only captures
the inpatient care associated with a spinal surgical procedure and
the follow-up care provided through thirty days post-discharge.
Consequently, it does not address overutilization of the surgical
procedure itself or excessive outpatient care provided outside the
narrow time window. A broad episode measure for chronic back
pain, however, would bundle together all services related to manag-
ing the condition for an extended period of time. This means
hospitals and their affiliated providers who aggressively treat back
pain patients with costly interventions, including inpatient surgery,
will have higher per capita costs than their more conservative peers,
and thus have a lower VBP efficiency score. So unlike the narrower
lumbar spine fusion/refusion episode measure, a broader measure
for chronic back pain would penalize those hospitals that, together
with their affiliated physicians, perform unnecessary or excessive
surgeries or other costly interventions when treating chronic back
pain. In contrast, hospitals that lower the cost of treating chronic
back pain patients would achieve a higher VBP efficiency score,
which could translate into higher Medicare payments.
As this example illustrates, incorporating broad episode-based ef-
ficiency measures into the Hospital VBP Program financially
incentivizes hospitals to reduce the overtreatment of Medicare pa-
tients across all patient care settings. In response to these
incentives, hospital management would support efforts to reduce
the volume and intensity of care. For example, they could closely
monitor the appropriateness of inpatient admissions, surgeries, and
other costly procedures; tie physician bonuses to their reducing
costs rather than rewarding “productivity;” and encourage greater
adherence to practice guidelines targeting the overuse of certain
services.178 Hospitals also might think twice before building centers
of excellence or investing in expensive technology that encourages
overutilization. Clinical leadership roles could be filled by individu-
als with conservative practice styles, who in turn would influence
others within the organization to practice cost-conscious care. Simi-
larly, hospitals may prefer affiliations with more efficient physicians
178. Under the ABIM Foundation’s Choosing Wisely campaign, over fifty national organi-
zations representing medical specialists have identified commonly overprescribed tests and
procedures. Each list is based on evidence-based recommendations intended to facilitate bet-
ter decisions as to the appropriateness of the test or procedure for a particular patient. See
Roni Caryn Rabin, Doctor Panels Recommend Fewer Tests for Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2012, at
A10 (discussing the efforts by medical specialty boards to reduce unnecessary care); CHOOS-
ING WISELY: AN INITIATIVE OF THE ABIM FOUNDATION, http://www.choosingwisely.org
(discussing the Choosing Wisely campaign).
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and hesitate to grant staff privileges to physicians who overtreat pa-
tients. In time, a new culture of cost-consciousness would emerge
within the hospital organization, with hospitals and their physicians
utilizing fewer and less costly resources.
This Article’s proposal also nudges the health care industry to-
ward collaborative arrangements that eventually would support
providers assuming greater financial risk under Medicare bundled
payments, shared savings and risk, and capitated payment arrange-
ments.179 To successfully reduce unnecessary or excessive care, a
hospital must work closely with its affiliated physicians. Together
they must identify gaps between their existing patient care practices
and efficient practices, and then address those gaps through train-
ing and the development of new patient care protocols.180
Experienced hospital administrators also can assist physician
groups in implementing more cost-effective patient care models
outside the hospital setting. For example, hospital administrators
can share their expertise and data analytics, support greater coordi-
nation among the various physicians caring for a patient, and
provide health information systems.181 These initial collaborations
would support hospitals and physicians transitioning to ACOs or
other organizations that can assume the financial risk inherent in
bundled payment and shared savings programs.
Moreover, because the Hospital VBP Program applies to most
hospitals participating in Medicare,182 this Article’s proposal incen-
tivizes integration across the entire hospital industry, and not
simply among those hospitals voluntarily participating in the Bun-
dled Payments and Shared Savings Programs.
179. Cf. Damberg et al., supra note 164, at 9 (stating that a “building block” that begins
with adjustments to fee-for-service payments, such as pay for performance financial incen-
tives, would support later moves toward a prospective payment approach for episodes (such
as bundled payments paid on a prospective basis)).
180. Cf. Mantel, supra note 47, at 1413–18 (discussing how collaborations such as ACOs
can support efforts to improve both efficiency and quality).
181. See generally Mantel, supra note 45, at 470 (explaining that health care organizations,
such as hospitals, “can provide the capital, technology, and staff needed to support today’s
practice of medicine . . . .”).
182. IPPS and the Hospital VBP Program apply to “subsection (d) hospitals.” Subsection
(d) hospitals includes hospitals located in the fifty states or the District of Columbia other
than psychiatric hospitals, rehabilitation hospitals, pediatric hospitals, hospital with an aver-
age inpatient length of stay greater than twenty-five days, and hospital involved extensively in
treatment for or research on cancer. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(1)(B).
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B. Deterring the Undertreatment of Patients
As with all financial incentives that reward providers for lowing
costs, introducing episode-based efficiency measures into the Hos-
pital VBP Program might lead hospitals and their affiliated
physicians to reduce not only excessive care, but also appropriate
care.183 As discussed below, the risk that financial incentives will
lead to substandard care is real, although often overstated. For this
reason, it is necessary to incorporate into this Article’s proposal
safeguards that would protect Medicare patients from
undertreatment.
Although many health care providers sincerely believe that finan-
cial incentives do not affect their professional judgment,184
empirical research shows otherwise.185 For example, physicians paid
on a capitated basis prescribe fewer drugs, see their patients for
fewer physician visits, limit the number of diagnostic procedures
done, make fewer referrals for elective surgery, and hospitalize
their patients less often.186 The theory of cognitive motivation sug-
gests the reason for this.187 As explained previously in Part II.B.2,
physicians may be subconsciously biased to make clinical decisions
consistent with their personal self-interest, despite their strong com-
mitment to their patients’ welfare.188 Consequently, if hospitals
looking to lower costs reward physicians for doing so, physicians
may be cognitively motivated to justify the delay or withholding of
beneficial care.
Nevertheless, the risk that hospitals and their affiliated physicians
will provide substandard care may be small. Psychologists have
183. Cf. AM. HOSP. ASS’N COMM. ON RESEARCH, supra note 164, at 9 (“One potential unin-
tended consequence [of bundling payments for episodes of care] is that necessary care may
also be reduced.”).
184. See Kevin Grumbach, et al., Primary Care Physicians’ Experience of Financial Incentives in
Managed-Care Systems, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516, 1518–19 (1998) (reporting that although
the majority of physicians reported pressure from managed care organizations to limit refer-
rals, only seventeen percent stated that such pressure compromised patient care); James D.
Reschovsky et al., Effects of Compensation Methods and Physician Group Structure on Physicians’
Perceived Incentives to Alter Services to Patients, 41 HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TRUST 1200, 1209 (2006)
(reporting that the majority of physicians with financial incentives to reduce services never-
theless believe they can provide high quality care to their patients and make clinical decisions
in the best interest of patients).
185. See Carine Chaix-Couturier et al., Effects of Financial Incentives of Medical Practice, 12
INT’L J. FOR QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE 133 (2000) (summarizing results from studies finding
that financial incentives impact physicians’ utilization and referral rates).
186. See id. at 135–37.
187. See generally Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs, Motivated Cognition, in ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 594 (Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs eds., 2007)
(explaining cognitive motivation).
188. See supra Part III.A.2.
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found that when individuals consciously construct a justification for
their self-serving, subconscious judgments, they “attempt to be ra-
tional and to construct a justification for their desired conclusion
that would persuade a dispassionate observer.”189 This means indi-
viduals’ capacity for reaching a self-serving conclusion “is
constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justi-
fications for these conclusions.”190 So although providers may be
able to justify delaying or denying discretionary care falling within
medicine’s grey zone, it would be difficult to justify the withholding
of care backed by strong evidence of medical efficacy. For this rea-
son, it is unlikely that hospitals and physicians would withhold or
delay care that clearly is medically appropriate, even if doing so
serves their financial interest.191 Indeed, several studies have found
that when physicians are given financial incentives to lower costs,
they only reduce care of questionable or uncertain clinical benefit,
and not care of known clinical benefit.192
Additional considerations also may counteract a hospital’s finan-
cial incentives to undertreat patients under a Hospital VBP
Program that rewards lower costs. Fear of malpractice lawsuits may
deter a hospital and its affiliated physicians from denying patients
care of clear clinical value.193 Hospitals and their affiliated physi-
cians also may fear that they will lose patients to competitors if they
develop a reputation for providing low quality care.194 Relatedly,
189. Kunda, supra note 92, at 482–83.
190. Id. at 480.
191. See Mantel, supra note 45, at 504–05.
192. See Sean P. Elliott et al., Reduction in Physician Reimbursement and Use of Hormone Ther-
apy in Prostate Cancer, 102 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1826 (2010) (finding that reductions in
reimbursement rates for ADT was associated with a reduction in overtreatment without a
reduction in needed services); Vahakn B. Shahinian et al., Reimbursement Policy and Androgen-
Deprivation Therapy for Prostate Cancer, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1822 (2010) (finding that reduc-
tions in reimbursement for androgen-deprivation therapy (ADT) was associated with a
reduction in inappropriate and discretionary use of ADT, but not of use considered appro-
priate); Joannie Shen et al., The Effects of Payment Method on Clinical Decision-Making, 42 MED.
CARE 297 (2004) (finding that capitated payment lead physicians to reduce health care re-
source expenditures on discretionary care of relatively small or questionable benefits to the
patient, but not on care that offered large, undeniable benefits to patients).
193. See Mehlman, supra note 13, at 858 (“The fear of malpractice is probably the most
effective pressure on providers to refrain from denying nonwasteful technology to
patients.”).
194. Although the difficulties faced by patients in evaluating the care they receive may
limit their ability to make informed choices among providers, some providers nevertheless
are motivated to provide high quality care in order to protect their reputations. See DEP’T OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION 17 (2004)
(stating that although there exists informational and payment barriers to effective competi-
tion, competition can play an important role in enhancing quality of care); Anne Frølich et
al., A Behavioral Model of Clinician Responses to Incentives to Improve Quality, 80 HEALTH POL’Y
179, 187 (2007) (discussing a study of Wisconsin hospitals finding that public reporting of
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private payors may be unwilling to contract with hospitals and physi-
cians that provide lower quality care.195 Finally, payors offering a
tiered provider network plan may assign poor performing providers
to tiers with higher cost-sharing.196
Despite these considerations, the financial incentives inherent in
this Article’s proposal may lead some hospitals and their affiliated
physicians to inappropriately stint on the care they provide patients
in an effort to raise their VBP efficiency scores. To guard against
this, the Hospital VBP Program should include episode-based qual-
ity measures for the clinical conditions selected for the efficiency
measures.197 For example, an efficiency measure for heart disease
could be paired with quality measures for heart disease, such as
measures evaluating the incidence of heart attacks among heart dis-
ease patients or mortality rates for heart disease patients. Because
hospitals performing poorly on the VBP quality measures are penal-
ized with lower Medicare payment rates, marrying episode-based
efficiency measures with quality measures will counteract incentives
to withhold or delay beneficial care.198
quality performance made hospitals more likely to adopt quality improvement programs);
David Hyman, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the
Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 957 n.364 (2005) (stating that one
motive of providers for improving quality may be concern for their reputation).
195. See infra note 218. Managed care plans also are limiting their enrollees to a single or
select hospitals for particular procedures, with hospitals selected based on their provision of
high-quality care and willingness to discount their prices. See James C. Robinson & Kimberly
MacPherson, Payers Test Reference Pricing and Centers of Excellence to Steer Patients to Low-Price and
High-Quality Providers, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2028, 2029–30 (2012) (explaining centers-of-excel-
lence contracting).
196. See Paul Fronstin, Tiered Networks for Hospital and Physicians Health Care Services, EBRI
ISSUE BRIEF NO. 206, 3 (2003), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0803ib.pdf (explaining
that payors with tiered networks may assign providers to tiers based on their quality of care).
197. See NATIONAL QUALITY FORUM, supra note 176, at 6 (stating that the NQF supports
using measures on resource use in conjunction with quality measures, because using the
former alone “may lead to adverse unintended consequences in the health care system”);
Tom MaCurdy et al., ACUMEN, OPTIMAL PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE SCORES: HOW TO INCENTIVIZE
PHYSICIANS TO BEHAVE EFFICIENTLY USING EPISODE-BASED MEASURES 37 (Feb. 2011) (stating
that a pay-for-performance system that only rewards providers for cost efficiency “ignores the
potential tradeoffs between cost efficiency and quality of care,” and that one option for ad-
dressing this “is to integrate quality or outcome measures into the [pay-for-performance]
scheme”). Cf. Hussey et al., supra note 169, at 2118 (stating that bundled payments for epi-
sodes requires “robust quality measurement to guard against the potential adverse effects of
bundled payment, such as stinting on care”).
198. Posting on Medicare’s Hospital Compare web site each hospital’s score on the epi-
sode-based quality measures would further safeguard patients from subpar care, because
poor performance on the quality measures would harm a hospital’s reputation with both
patients and private payors.
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C. Transitioning to Episode-Based Efficiency Measures
Before incorporating episode-based efficiency measures into the
Hospital VBP Program, CMS should implement a hospital feedback
program modeled after the Medicare Physician Feedback Report-
ing Program described below.
The design and implementation of episode-based efficiency mea-
sures raise numerous technical challenges.199 Medicare patients
often receive treatment for multiple medical conditions, so care as-
sociated with the measured condition must be separated from care
related to other conditions. Typically the process of assigning care
to specific episodes is done using episode grouper software, with
the software’s algorithms determining which services will be bun-
dled together in a particular episode.200 CMS would need to ensure
the validity of the software’s logic so that care related to a particular
episode is in fact captured while unrelated care is excluded.201 In
addition, CMS would need to determine how broadly or narrowly
to define the selected episodes202 and how best to address patients
with multiple co-occurring conditions.203 Other critical issues
199. See generally NATIONAL QUALITY FORUM, supra note 176 (highlighting some of the
challenges in designing and implementing episode-based efficiency measures); ROBERT
WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, MEDICARE’S VALUE-BASED, PHYSICIAN PAYMENT MODIFIER: IM-
PROVING THE QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY OF MEDICAL CARE (2012) (same); Damberg et al., supra
note 164 (same); Hussey et al., supra note 147 (same).
200. See NATIONAL QUALITY FORUM, supra note 176, at 6. Although most episode grouper
software sort claims data into episodes of care, future software may use data contained in
electronic health records rather than claims records. See id.
201. For example, for a diabetic patient that suffered pneumonia, the episode grouper
software should attribute to the diabetes episode all care related to the patient’s diabetes,
while attributing to the pneumonia episode all care related to the patient’s pneumonia.
202. Patients with a given clinical condition could be grouped into a single, broad epi-
sode or grouped into subgroups based on severity or comorbidities. See Damberg et al., supra
note 164, at xix (explaining that patients can be grouped broadly or into separate categories
“based on the degree of advancement of their disease and other existing comorbidities”). For
example, AMI patients could be grouped into a single major episode, or could be stratified
into subgroups based on whether they received certain procedural interventions, such as a
percutaneous coronary intervention or coronary artery bypass graft.
203. When patients have multiple comorbidities, or co-occurring conditions, the condi-
tions can be lumped together in a single episode or separated into two or more separate
episodes. See Hussey et al., supra note 147, at 1412–13 (“Consideration needs to be given as to
how to account for the multiple comorbidities of many [Medicare] beneficiaries and whether
to lump related and co-occurring conditions together or to address them separately.”). For
example, if an AMI patient also has hypertension, the treatment of the latter could be in-
cluded in the AMI episode or separated into a distinct episode for hypertension. The
question proves challenging for two reasons: First, co-morbid conditions often interact so
that the presence of a second condition (e.g., hypertension) may affect the cost of managing
the primary condition (e.g., AMI). See NATIONAL QUALITY FORUM, supra note 176, at 15 (dis-
cussing interactive episodes). Second, accurately attributing services to separate episodes can
be difficult. As explained by two commentators:
FALL 2015] Spending Medicare’s Dollars Wisely 167
include the selection of a risk-adjustment methodology204 and the
process for assigning an episode to a specific hospital (a process
called “attribution”).205
A transitional approach similar to the approach adopted on the
physician payment side would allow CMS to work through the im-
plementation challenges described above. The Physician VBP
Modifier builds on the Medicare Physician Feedback Reporting
Program. Under the Physician Feedback Reporting Program, CMS
provides to physicians confidential reports (called physician quality
and resource use reports (QRURs)) comparing their resource use
in treating Medicare beneficiaries.206 Beginning in 2013, CMS used
its newly developed episode grouper to issue QRURs to certain phy-
sician groups comparing their episode-based costs for certain
conditions.207 The reports also show resource use by type of
[F]or a patient who has congestive heart failure, diabetes, and renal failure and is
hospitalized for uncontrolled diabetes, there is considerable uncertainty in identifying
precisely which services are related to the diabetes care rather than the care of the
heart failure or renal failure (e.g., a posthopitalization emergency department visit for
syncope could be related to the heart failure rather than diabetes).
Averill et al., supra note 176, at 15.
204. Risk adjustment is a statistical process that adjusts for patient characteristics. Risk
adjustment would ensure that differences among patients do not unfairly impact a hospital’s
performance on episode-based efficiency measures. See ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION,
supra note 199, at 13 (discussing risk adjustment). Risk adjustment is necessary because pa-
tient characteristics that are beyond the health care provider’s control, such as age and co-
morbidities, impact the amount of resources used to treat patients. Because older, sicker
patients typically require a higher intensity of care, hospitals treating older and sicker pa-
tients would have higher per capita costs relative to other hospitals in the absence of risk
adjustment.
205. For example, an episode first could be assigned to the physician group or individual
physician providing a plurality of the physician services included in the episode, and then be
assigned to the hospital at which the physician group or physician provides the majority of
their hospital-based services. Alternatively, for episodes that include a hospitalization, the
episode could be attributed to the hospital billing for the plurality of hospital services. See
generally Damberg et al., supra note 164, at 71–72 (describing various attribution
methodologies).
206. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 3003, 124 Stat.
119 (2010). The Physician Feedback Reporting Program was initially established by section
131 of the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008. Medicare Im-
provement for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-275, 122 Stat. 2494. To
facilitate CMS’s providing feedback to physicians about their costs, the ACA also requires
CMS to develop episode grouper software. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-148, sec. 3003, § 1848(n)(9)(A)(ii), 124 Stat. 119 (2010). CMS developed a proto-
type episode grouper in 2012. See Revisions to Payment Policies II, supra note 67, at 74785. In
2012, CMS also awarded a contract to Brandeis University for the development of a public
domain grouper for Medicare. See NATIONAL QUALITY FORUM, supra note 176, at 4 (discussing
the Medicare Public Grouper).
207. The 2013 QRURs compared physician groups’ episode-based costs for pneumonia,
AMI, coronary artery disease, coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG), and percutaneous cor-
onary intervention. See Revisions to Payment Policies III, supra note 142, at 43500, 43502
168 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 49:1
service,208 allowing physicians to compare their practice patterns to
other physicians and identify services potentially being overutilized.
The knowledge CMS gained from the Physician Feedback Report-
ing Program supported its implementation of the Physician VBP
Modifier.
CMS similarly should establish a hospital feedback reporting pro-
gram, with the hospital reports comparing hospitals’ (and their
affiliated physicians’) per capita costs for the selected episodes.209
As with the physician QRURs, providing similar reports to hospitals
would allow CMS to test various approaches to constructing broad
episode measures before linking them to IPPS payments under the
Hospital VBP Program.210 Hospitals and others in the health care
industry also could provide valuable feedback to CMS on the mea-
sures included in the reports,211 which would both ensure the
episode measures’ validity and mitigate hospitals’ resistance to their
subsequent use in the Hospital VBP Program.212
(discussing the supplemental QRURs issued in 2013). More recent reports compare per cap-
ita costs for beneficiaries with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), heart failure,
coronary artery disease (CAD), and diabetes. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
2012 QUALITY AND RESOURCE USE REPORT AND PHYSICIAN QUALITY REPORTING SYSTEM FEED-
BACK REPORT, Exhibit 7 (2013) (sample QRUR report), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/PhysicianFeedbackProgram/Downloads/PY2012-GPRO-
QRUR-Sample.pdf. CMS plans to include additional clinical episodes in future QRURs. Addi-
tional clinical conditions under consideration by CMS include congestive heart failure,
cardiac arrhythmias, hip fracture, osteoarthritis, cataract, glaucoma, chronic obstructive lung
disease, and respiratory failure. See Revisions to Payment Policies II, supra note 67, at 74786.
208. The QRURs show per capita costs by service type across all Medicare beneficiaries,
rather than by specific conditions. The services include inpatient hospital care, outpatient
hospital care, evaluation and management services, procedures, emergency services, ancillary
services (lab, imaging, and durable medical equipment), and post-acute care (skilled nursing
facility, home health, psychiatric, rehabilitation). See id. at Exhibits 9, 10.
209. CMS could establish a hospital feedback reporting program under its broad author-
ity to “test innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce program expenditures.”
42 U.S.C. § 1315a(a)(1).
210. See Hussey et al., supra note 147, at 1413 (“Testing the face validity of various ap-
proaches to defining an episode with providers will serve to highlight potential
implementation barriers and can be used to refine definitions.”).
211. CMS worked closely with physicians and others in developing the episode measures
included in the physician QRURs and, ultimately, the Physician VBP Modifier. See Revisions
to Payment Policies II, supra note 67, at 74786 (commenting that CMS develops the physician
QRURs in an iterative manner, working with and soliciting feedback from specialty societies,
professional associations and others).
212. Cf. Hussey et al., supra note 147, at 1413 (stating that soliciting physicians’ input
while defining episodes “will ensure the clinical integrity of the episodes and help mitigate
resistance to their use among providers”).
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D. The Possibility of Unintended Consequences
Notwithstanding the advantages of this Article’s proposal, it
raises two important concerns. First, rather than incentivize hospi-
tals to reduce overtreatment of Medicare patients, economic theory
suggests that inefficient hospitals may respond by increasing the vol-
ume and intensity of care they provide to patients. Second,
inefficient hospitals penalized under my proposal with lower Medi-
care payments may offset their losses by raising the prices they
charge privately insured patients. This subpart discusses these con-
cerns, and concludes that ultimately they do not render the
proposal unworkable.
1. Higher Volume and Intensity of Care
Part IV.A argues that linking a hospital’s payment rates to its per-
formance on episode-based efficiency measures will encourage
hospitals and their affiliated physicians to reduce the volume and
intensity of care they provide to patients. Critics, however, may ar-
gue that the opposite will occur. In an effort to maintain their
overall revenue, inefficient hospitals penalized with lower payment
rates may increase their volume of services and/or shift their mix of
services to more highly compensated care.213 In other words, rather
than utilize fewer high cost resources in an effort to raise their VBP
efficiency scores, inefficient hospitals and their affiliated physicians
may hospitalize even more patients, perform more invasive cardiol-
ogy procedures, treat more chronic back pain patients surgically,
and so on. For the reasons discussed below, however, business con-
siderations will lead most hospitals to focus not on increasing their
volume and intensity of care, but on shifting from cultures of over-
treatment to cultures of efficiency.
Hospitals can induce demand for their services through their af-
filiated physicians. Whereas the demand for most non-medical
services and products is driven largely by consumers, vulnerable pa-
tients with limited information rely heavily on their physicians’
guidance. This allows physicians to shape the demand for both
their own services and hospitals’ services, a phenomenon known as
213. See MaCurdy et al., supra note 1197, at 29 (“Inefficient providers whose reimburse-
ments are cut may perform more episodes to make up for lost income.”); Chapin White &
Tracy Yee, When Medicare Cuts Hospital Prices, Seniors Use Less Inpatient Care, 32 HEALTH AFF.
1789, 1789 (2013) (stating that hospitals might react to Medicare price cuts by “increas[ing]
the volume of Medicare services they provide to make up for the lower per service price”).
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“supplier-induced demand.”214 For example, for patients suffering
from chronic back pain, treating physicians may induce demand for
hospital care by recommending spinal fusion surgery over bed rest,
drug therapy, physical therapy, or other outpatient treatments. In
theory, then, an inefficient hospital penalized with lower Medicare
payments under my proposal could offset its lost revenue by induc-
ing demand for more care or care of higher intensity, a behavior
known as volume and intensity offsetting.215
In practice, however, offsetting lower Medicare payments
through induced demand may not be a realistic strategy for many
hospitals. Profit-maximizing hospitals already may be maximizing
the volume and intensity of care provided to Medicare patients.216
For hospitals not currently maximizing their volume and intensity
of care, it is by no means certain that the additional revenue from
any induced demand would fully negate the lost revenue from
lower Medicare payment rates. The ability of providers to induce
demand for more care of higher intensity has limits. Professional
norms, the threat of malpractice liability, and the possibility of non-
payment deter the provision of clinically inappropriate care. In ad-
dition, hospitals and physicians that induce demand for care of
questionable value may find themselves subject to a fraud investiga-
tion by federal prosecutors for overtreatment.217 Many hospitals
may therefore conclude that increasing the volume and intensity of
care provided to Medicare beneficiaries is not economically feasi-
ble, and that their efforts would be better spent improving their
performance on the VBP efficiency measures through reduced
utilization.
Various market pressures also may motivate hospitals to improve
their VBP efficiency scores. Hospitals that perform poorly on the
214. See REXFORD E. SANTERRE, HEALTH ECONOMICS: THEORIES, INSIGHTS, AND INDUSTRY
STUDIES 226 (1996) (explaining “The Supplier-Induced Demand Theory”); John Wennberg
et al., Professional Uncertainty and the Problem of Supplier-Induced Demand, 16 SOC. SCI. & MED.
811, 811–12 (1982) (same).
215. See Christopher S. Brunt, Medicare Part B Intensity and Volume Offset, HEALTH ECON. 1
(July 22, 2014 ) (defining and explaining volume and intensity offsetting).
216. It may be that the approximately seventy-eight percent of hospitals that are either
nonprofit or government-owned do not consistently maximize profit, as they are guided in
part by their charitable missions. See Austin B. Frakt, How Much Do Hospitals Cost Shift? A
Review of the Evidence, 89 MILBANK Q. 90, 111 (2011) (“[N]onprofit hospitals can be guided by
vague missions and influenced by stakeholders with different objectives. Consequently, they
may not consistently maximize anything.”). If this is indeed the case, some hospitals may have
the ability to increase the volume and intensity of care they provide.
217. See Isaac D. Buck, Caring Too Much: Misapplying the False Claims Act to Target Overtreat-
ment, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 463, 467–68 (2013) (explaining that federal enforcement agencies
increasingly are using the False Claims Act against providers who have administered too
much care).
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episode-based efficiency measures may find themselves at a compet-
itive disadvantage when contracting with private payors. Health
insurers increasingly are adopting narrow networks comprised of
lower cost providers, with enrollees receiving care from “out of net-
work” providers paying significantly higher cost-sharing or footing
their bill entirely.218 Health insurers also are making greater use of
tiered provider networks, with plan enrollees paying lower cost-
sharing when they select efficient, high-value providers and higher
cost-sharing when treated by less efficient providers.219 Conse-
quently, hospitals with a poor track record for lowering costs risk
losing patients to other hospitals, as plans may exclude them from
their networks or preferred tiers.220
In distinguishing efficient hospitals from inefficient ones, private
payors likely would consider hospitals’ efficiency scores under the
Hospital VBP program.221 Health providers’ operations, including
their clinical patterns of care, typically are consistent across all pa-
tients, whether insured privately or by a government payor.222
Accordingly, hospitals that, together with their affiliated physicians,
provide a higher volume and intensity of care to Medicare patients
generally do the same with their privately insured patients. Private
payors therefore would disfavor hospitals that perform poorly on
Medicare’s VBP efficiency measures, believing that such hospitals
218. See Joseph Burns, Narrow Networks Found to Yield Substantial Savings, MANAGED CARE
(2012) (summarizing comments from health insurance executives, who described adopting
narrow networks built around cost-effective, high-quality providers); Merrill Goozner, Build-
ing Narrow Networks that Work, 43 MODERN HEALTHCARE 26 (2013) (same); see also AMERICA’S
HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, ISSUE BRIEF: HIGH-VALUE PROVIDER NETWORKS 3 (Dec. 2013)
(describing trends of insurers adopting smaller provider networks comprised of providers
with a track record of providing high-quality, cost-efficient care).
219. See Fronstin, supra note 196, at 3 (explaining tiered provider networks). Providers
also may be assigned to tiers based on their charges and/or quality. See id.
220. See AM. HOSP. ASS’N, HOSPITALS IN PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE: A COMPENDIUM OF AC-
TION GUIDES 27 (2013), www.hpoe.org//2013_HPOE_Compendium.pdf (explaining that less
efficient providers may “be excluded from the narrow and tiered networks that are being
formed nationwide”); Suzanne Delbanco, The Payment Reform Landscape: Benefit and Network
Design Strategies to Complement Payment Reform, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 4, 2014), http://.
healthaffairs.org/////-reform-landscape-benefit-and-network-design-strategies-to-comple
ment-payment-reform/ (stating that higher cost providers “do not make it into the preferred
tiers”); Brian A. Liang, Deselection Under Harper v. Healthsource: A Blow for Maintaining Patient-
Physician Relationships in the Era of Managed Care?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 799, 799–803
(1997) (explaining that deselection is driven by managed care plan’s desire to minimize
costs).
221. Medicare’s Hospital Compare web site currently posts data on hospitals’ perform-
ance on the measures selected under the Hospital VBP program. See Hospital Compare,
MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/search.html.
222. See Austin B. Frakt, The End of Hospital Cost Shifting and the Quest for Hospital Productiv-
ity, 49 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1, 3 (2014).
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similarly overtreat their privately insured patients. Hospitals that in-
crease the volume or intensity of care in response to lower
Medicare reimbursement rates thus risk hurting their competitive
position in the private sector.
In addition, hospitals that focus on increasing utilization, rather
than transitioning to a culture of efficiency, will be ill-prepared for
a new world that ties providers’ payments to performance. Like
Medicare, the private sector is in the midst of a historic shift away
from fee-to-service to value-based and other risk-based payment
methodologies, including bundled payments, shared savings, and
capitation.223 Success under these new payment models will require
a culture that emphasizes efficiency over volume, as “getting to ap-
propriate utilization is critical.”224 Hospitals unable to make this
shift risk financial stress under these new payment models.
Physicians and investors also may penalize hospitals with high
utilization rates. As physicians increasingly face their own financial
incentives to lower costs under the Medicare Physician VBP Modi-
fier and their contracts with private payors, they may spurn higher
223. See AVAILITY, PROVIDER ATTITUDES TOWARD VALUE-BASED PAYMENT MODELS 8 (Apr.
2014), http://www.availity.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/provider-attitudes-research-
availity-may2014.pdf (survey of providers finding that although only twenty percent of provid-
ers’ current revenue derives from value-based purchasing arrangements, most expect value-
based purchasing to become the dominant payment model, reaching sixty percent by 2017);
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, VALUE PROJECT: PHASE 2, DEFINING AND DELIVERING VALUE 11
(2012) (2012 survey reporting that survey participants anticipate growth in value-based pay-
ment mechanisms); TOM MAIN & RICK WEIL, THE VIEW FROM HEALTHCARE’S FRONT LINES: AN
OLIVER WYMAN CEO SURVEY 2, http://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliverwyman/
global/en/files/archive/2011/The_View_from_Healthcares_Front_Lines_An_Oliver_Wy
man_CEO_Survey.pdf (reporting that in their interviews with industry executives, executives
were “virtually unanimous in believing that the system is on the verge of a shift from a vol-
ume-based to a value-based model over the next decade”); MCKESSON HEALTH SOLS., THE
STATE OF VALUE-BASED REIMBURSEMENT AND THE TRANSITION FROM VOLUME TO VALUE IN 2014
22 (2014), http://mhsinfo.mckesson.com/rs/mckessonhealthsolutions/images/MHS-2014-
Signature-Research-White-Paper.pdf (reporting that survey participants expect fee-for-service
to comprise less than one-third of providers’ total reimbursements five years from now);
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, VALUE OVER VOLUME: RISKS, PITFALLS AND OPPORTUNITIES 3
(2013) (commenting that the health care sector has begun “a historic shift to value-based
reimbursement after decades of volume-based incentives”).
224. HURON HEALTHCARE, INNOVATION IN ACTION: INSIGHTS ON ACHIEVING HEALTHCARE
TRANSFORMATION 15 (2013), http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/Insights/Perspective/
Healthcare/~/media/Insights-Media-Content/PDF/Healthcare/Innovation_In_Action_Re
port.pdf (summarizing comments of Andrew A. Ziskind, M.D.). Similarly, in a recent survey
of 200 industry executives, seventy-three percent either “agreed completely” or “somewhat
agreed” with the statement that providers “need to immediately begin shifting their focus
from volume to value.” See Forbes Insights Study Signals Imminent Health Care Shift Toward Value-
Based Purchasing (VBP), FORBES (June 5, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbespr/2012/
06/05/forbes-insights-study-signals-imminent-health-care-shift-toward-value-based-purchas-
ing-vbp/.
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cost hospitals in favor of their more efficient competitors. In addi-
tion, non-profit hospitals that fail to reduce costs may have difficulty
obtaining bond financing to support their capital projects because
lenders may consider them poor risks in a market moving toward
value-based payments and risk-based payments that shift financial
risk from payors to providers.225 Accordingly, inducing demand in
response to lower Medicare payment rates would be a short-sighted
strategy that would adversely impact a hospital’s long-term interests.
Studies examining provider responses to past reductions in Medi-
care payment rates support the above analysis. Whereas earlier
studies found that lower Medicare payment rates were in fact associ-
ated with increases in volume,226 more recent studies find no
evidence of volume-offsetting.227 Indeed, one study reported that “a
10 percent reduction in Medicare prices [for inpatient care] was
associated with a 4.6 percent reduction in discharges among the eld-
erly” as well as with reduced inpatient bed capacity.228 These more
recent findings coincide with the expansion of managed care in the
225. See MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, DOING MORE WITH LESS: CREDIT IMPLICATIONS OF
HOSPITAL TRANSITION STRATEGIES IN ERA OF REFORM 1 (2012) (“Hospitals that can manage
well during this transition [in payment methodologies] should be able to maintain if not
improve their credit ratings. Conversely, hospitals that cannot navigate the payment reduc-
tions or reduce their expense structures quickly enough to mitigate the impact may see
rating pressure.”).
226. See Gloria J. Bazzoli et al., The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and U.S. Hospital Operations,
41 INQUIRY 401 (2004) (finding that hospitals increased their Medicare admissions following
reductions in Medicare inpatient rates after passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997);
Brunt, supra note 215, at 3 (summarizing earlier studies finding that reductions in physicians’
fees were associated with increased volume in physician services).
227. See Brunt, supra note 215, at 3, 16 (summarizing studies finding either a positive rela-
tionship between Medicare fees and volume or no significant effect, and reporting results of
the authors’ own study finding “little to no evidence of volume offsetting”).
228. White & Yee, supra note 213, at 1789, 1794. But see Daifeng He & Jennifer M. Mellor,
Hospital Volume Responses to Medicare’s Outpatient Prospective Payment System: Evidence from Florida,
31 J. HEALTH ECON. 730, 730 (2012) (finding that Medicare payment cuts lead to a lower
volume at hospitals with a low percentage of Medicare patients, but volume increases at hospi-
tals with a high percentage of Medicare patients). White and Yee cautioned that although
lower Medicare payments for inpatient care under IPPS led to lower inpatient admission rates,
it is not known whether these price reductions spurred an increase in outpatient care. See
White and Yee, supra note 213, at 1794. In other words, when faced with lower IPPS pay-
ments, providers might have offset reductions in their inpatient care revenue by increasing
their volume and intensity of outpatient care. Even if providers did in fact respond to past
reductions in IPPS payment rates by inducing demand in the outpatient setting, they never-
theless are unlikely to do so under my proposal. As explained in Part IV.A, broadly defined
episode-based efficiency measures link hospitals’inpatient payment rates to the volume and
intensity of care provided in both the inpatient and outpatient settings. So whereas in the past
hospitals that induced demand for outpatient care suffered no financial consequences under
Medicare for doing so, my proposal would penalize such hospitals with lower inpatient pay-
ment rates.
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private sector, suggesting that managed care has constrained hospi-
tals’ ability to induce demand.229 To the extent the shift to value-
based and risk-based contracts imposes similar pressures on hospi-
tals to lower costs, this will further limit hospitals’ ability to pursue a
strategy of inducing demand rather than reducing utilization.
Nevertheless, some hospitals performing poorly on the VBP effi-
ciency measures may pursue higher utilization over cost reduction.
Private payors generally must include in their plan networks domi-
nant or “must have” hospitals, that is hospitals with significant
prestige or large market share. Dominant hospitals therefore need
not fear exclusion from plans’ provider networks or preferred tiers,
and can resist payors’ push for value-based and risk-based con-
tracts.230 Consequently, the market pressures described above that
constrain hospitals’ ability to induce demand may be weak with re-
spect to dominant hospitals. Some dominant hospitals, then, might
respond to lower Medicare payments by increasing their volume
and intensity of care.231
Because of the possibility that some hospitals penalized with
lower Medicare payment rates under my proposal would induce de-
mand, penalized hospitals (and their affiliated physicians) should
be monitored for evidence of abuse.232 Should such monitoring re-
veal a pattern of induced demand, Congress could enact legislation
229. Cf. He & Mellor, supra note 228, at 738 (finding that in response to Medicare pay-
ment reductions for outpatient care, hospitals increased the number of procedures provided
to privately insured patients covered by traditional fee-for-service arrangements, but no evidence
that hospitals did so for privately insured patients enrolled in managed care plans, such as
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and preferred provider organizations (PPOs)).
230. See generally Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep
Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH AFF. 973, 973
(2012) (“‘[M]ust have’ providers—meaning providers that health plans must include in their
networks to attract employers and consumers—have used their clout to raise prices.”); Cha-
pin White et al., Understanding Differences Between High- and Low-Priced Hospitals: Implications for
Efforts to Rein in Costs, 33 HEALTH AFF. 324, 325, 329–30 (testing whether high-priced hospitals
“might enjoy ‘must have’ status in negotiations with private insurers because of the hospitals’
market share, . . . reputation, or unique services or geographic services area,” and finding
that “some hospitals have market power that allows them to negotiate high prices with private
health plans and operate under little pressure to contain costs”).
231. That being said, we should be careful not to overstate the likelihood that dominant
hospitals penalized with lower Medicare payment rates under my proposal would increase
the volume or intensity of care. Dominant hospitals that are already maximizing their volume
and intensity of care would be unable to offset reduced Medicare payments through induced
demand. In addition, as noted previously, providers’ ability to induce demand is not infi-
nite—at some point more care of higher intensity is clinically inappropriate.
232. For example, CMS could monitor the total per capita costs for the hospital’s affili-
ated physicians. As explained previously, the total per capita cost measure included in the
Physician VBP Modifier captures all care provided to a Medicare beneficiary and paid for
under Medicare Parts A and B. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. Physicians whose
patients on average receive a high volume and/or intensity of care will have higher total per
capita costs than those who successfully reduce utilization. Consequently, any increase in
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imposing additional penalties against hospitals that do so. For ex-
ample, imposing steeper reductions in Medicare payment rates for
hospitals that induce demand may deter doing so, as even domi-
nant hospitals may be unable to fully offset such reductions given
the inherent limits on inducing demand. Imposing additional pen-
alties thereby would encourage hospitals to focus on improving
their performance on the episode-based efficiency measures, rather
than increasing their volume and intensity of care.
2. Cost-Shifting
Some commentators also may express concern that inefficient
hospitals penalized with lower Medicare payment rates under this
Article’s proposal will engage in “cost-shifting.” Cost-shifting occurs
when hospitals facing reductions in their Medicare reimbursements
raise the prices they charge privately insured patients in an effort to
maintain their overall revenue.233 Although my proposal may lead a
few hospitals to engage in cost-shifting, for the reasons discussed
below, most hospitals will be unable to do so.
In general, hospitals’ capacity to engage in cost-shifting is cir-
cumscribed by factors similar to those that check their ability to
induce demand. Hospitals facing the prospect of exclusion from
plans’ networks or preferred tiers can ill afford to raise the prices
they charge private payors;234 nor can they negotiate for higher pay-
ments under value-based and risk-based contracts.235 Similarly,
hospitals that already fully exploit their market power would have
limited ability to extract even higher prices from payors.236 Recent
utilization or intensity by a hospital and its affiliated physicians would be reflected in the total
per capita cost measure.
233. See White and Yee, supra note 213, at 1789–90 (explaining cost-shifting).
234. See Frakt, supra note 216, at 122 (suggesting that plans “are better able to resist price
increases due to network-based contracting”).
235. Cf. James Robinson, Hospitals Respond to Medicare Payment Shortfalls By Both Shifting
Costs and Cutting Them, Based on Market Concentration, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1265, 1269 (2011)
(“Hospitals in competitive markets will be less able than those in concentrated markets to
raise prices . . . .”).
236. As explained by one commentator:
Market power cannot be profitably wielded indefinitely, however. Once a hospital has
fully exploited its market power, it has exhausted its ability to extract additional reve-
nue from further price increases. That is, an even higher price would drive away
enough customers (plans) that revenue would decrease, not increase.
Frakt, supra note 216, at 109; see also Frakt, supra note 222, at 1, 3 (concluding that in today’s
marketplace, cost shifting by hospitals “now appears to be largely infeasible[,] . . . [as] hospi-
tals may have already exploited their market power and lack further leverage to raise private
prices”).
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empirical studies support these predictions, finding that “the vast
majority of public payers’ [sic] shortfalls are accommodated by cost
cutting, not cost shifting.”237 In addition, the studies found that al-
though cost-shifting may occur in markets where hospitals have
market power, the resulting price increases are small and do not
fully offset the reductions in government payment rates.238 With
hospitals’ ability to cost-shift largely constrained, hospitals at risk of
performing poorly on the VBP efficiency measures would be moti-
vated to lower utilization in an effort to avoid reduced revenues.
* * * * *
In sum, incorporating into the Hospital VBP Program efficiency
measures based on broadly defined episodes of care would address
the problems that plague current and proposed Medicare payment
policies. Importantly, this Article’s proposal provides a powerful in-
ducement for hospitals to embrace a culture of cost-consciousness
and minimize patterns of overtreatment among their affiliated phy-
sicians. In addition, the proposal would push hospitals to work
more collaboratively with their affiliated physicians, laying the
groundwork for hospitals and physicians to someday assume finan-
cial risk under bundled payment, shared savings and risk, and
capitated payment arrangements.
Fortunately, CMS is well-positioned to implement this proposal.
Adopting the proposal would not require Congress to enact new
legislation, as current law affords CMS broad discretion in selecting
the efficiency measures incorporated into the Hospital VBP Pro-
gram.239 In addition, CMS could build on the experience and
insights gained from its use of episode-based efficiency measures
under the Medicare Physician Feedback Reporting Program and
Physician VBP Modifier. Finally, CMS could test possible episode-
based efficiency measures through a hospital feedback program
before their inclusion in the Hospital VBP Program to ensure their
validity.
237. Frakt, supra note 216, at 93.
238. See generally id. (summarizing research on cost-shifting); Frakt, supra note 222
(same).
239. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww(o)(2)(A), (B)(ii) (delegating to the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services broad authority to select the measures under the
Hospital VBP Program, including efficiency measures).
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CONCLUSION
Medicare’s relentlessly rising costs pose a significant threat to the
nation’s long-term finances. Medicare’s cost problem stems in part
from physicians doing too much for their Medicare patients—pro-
viding care that is medically unnecessary, inefficient, or of unknown
value. The challenge for Medicare, then, is how to encourage physi-
cians to reduce their overtreatment of patients.
The obvious solution is to reform how Medicare pays physicians
by financially rewarding physicians who reduce the volume and in-
tensity of care and penalizing those who do not. The Affordable
Care Act does exactly that by giving CMS the authority to link physi-
cians’ payment rates to their performance on various efficiency
measures. Yet simply refashioning how Medicare pays physicians is
not enough, as it ignores the profound influence of hospitals’ orga-
nizational cultures on physicians’ clinical decision-making.
Medicare payment policy therefore also must hold hospitals ac-
countable when their affiliated physicians overtreat patients.
To some extent, existing and proposed Medicare reforms
achieve this goal by penalizing hospitals when their physicians over-
treat patients. These reforms, however, do either too little or too
much. One group of reforms focuses narrowly on overtreatment in
the inpatient hospital setting, failing to recognize that hospitals’ or-
ganizational cultures also impact practice patterns in the outpatient
care setting. Other reforms require hospitals and their affiliated
physicians to have an administrative and operational infrastructure
that, for many, exceeds their current capacity.
This Article sets forth a novel policy that would avoid these short-
comings—incorporating into the Medicare Hospital VBP Program
broadly defined efficiency measures that would tie a hospital’s
Medicare payment rates to its success in lowering the cost of treat-
ing patients across all patient care settings. Reforming the Hospital
VBP Program in this manner would incentivize hospitals to reduce
the volume and intensity of care provided to patients across the
health care system. Importantly, because providers’ practice pat-
terns are similar for Medicare and privately insured patients, this
culture of cost-consciousness would not only ensure that Medicare
dollars are spent more wisely, but also would deter the overtreat-
ment of privately insured patients. My proposal thus would lead to
real savings for both Medicare and private payors by helping to en-
sure both the future viability of Medicare and lower premiums and
out-of-pocket spending for privately insured individuals.

